How to Reshape the Selection Boundaries between Traditional and Digital Supply Chain Finance Based on the Pledge Rate and Default Loss: Two Tripartite Game Models

IF 2.3 4区 社会学 Q1 SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY
Systems Pub Date : 2024-07-13 DOI:10.3390/systems12070253
Xiang Sun, Yue Wang, Yinzi Huang, Yue Zhang
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Abstract

The development of digital technologies such as blockchain has provided new possibilities for solving the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In order to explore the mutual influence of the participants in the supply chain, this paper constructs two static tripartite game models for traditional and digital supply chain finance, including a small and medium-sized enterprise (SME), a core enterprise (CE), and a financial institution (FI). The conditions for SME, CE, and FI to participate in digital supply chain finance, and the equilibrium strategy (repayment, repayment, loan) after participating in digital supply chain finance, are figured out. It is found that compared with the traditional supply chain, the digital supply chain expands the probability range of repayment for SME and CE by the change of pledge rate and default loss and broadens the probability range of repayment for CE by the change of default loss. Further, compared with the traditional supply chain finance, the greater the pledge rate of digital supply chain finance and the smaller the default loss, the stronger the willingness of the SME and CE to participate in the digital supply chain and the lower the willingness of the FI. After the three parties participate in the digital supply chain, however, the conclusion is the opposite. The smaller the pledge rate and the greater the default loss, the stronger the repayment willingness for the SME and CE and the stronger the loan willingness of the FI. Therefore, it is suggested to find the critical values of pledge rate and default loss and raise these two variables to an appropriate range to encourage all parties to voluntarily and consistently participate in digital supply chain financing.
如何基于质押率和违约损失重塑传统供应链金融和数字供应链金融的选择边界:两个三方博弈模型
区块链等数字技术的发展为解决中小企业融资难问题提供了新的可能。为了探讨供应链中各参与方的相互影响,本文构建了传统供应链金融和数字供应链金融的两个静态三方博弈模型,包括中小企业(SME)、核心企业(CE)和金融机构(FI)。研究了中小企业、核心企业和金融机构参与数字供应链金融的条件,以及参与数字供应链金融后的均衡策略(还款、还贷、贷款)。研究发现,与传统供应链相比,数字供应链通过质押率和违约损失的变化扩大了中小企业和行政长官的还款概率范围,通过违约损失的变化扩大了行政长官的还款概率范围。此外,与传统供应链金融相比,数字供应链金融的质押率越高,违约损失越小,中小企业和行政长官参与数字供应链的意愿就越强,金融机构的意愿就越低。然而,三方参与数字供应链后,结论却恰恰相反。质押率越小,违约损失越大,中小企业和行政长官的还款意愿越强,金融机构的贷款意愿越强。因此,建议找到质押率和违约损失的临界值,并将这两个变量提高到适当的范围,以鼓励各方自愿、持续地参与数字供应链融资。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Systems
Systems Decision Sciences-Information Systems and Management
CiteScore
2.80
自引率
15.80%
发文量
204
审稿时长
11 weeks
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