“Striving to Facilitate the Achievement of the PIRA's Aims”? The Labour Government, the Army and the Crisis of the British State over Northern Ireland 1972–76

Abstract

This article argues that there was a crisis within the British state over policy towards Northern Ireland (1972–76). The Conservative then Labour government pursued a broadly bipartisan and conciliatory policy, culminating in the failed powersharing experiment (1974). By contrast, the New Right within the Conservative Party but also powerful elements in the Army and Intelligence Services, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and Unionism opposed conciliation as ‘appeasement’ and even treachery. They claimed conciliation and rumours of British political support for withdrawal encouraged the IRA and undermined the repressive approach that was necessary to win. From this perspective, the Conservative then Labour government were, in effect, ‘… striving to facilitate the achievement of the PIRA's aims’ and so they resisted government policy. The crisis intensified as more troops were killed, and the Army suffered severe problems of morale, recruitment and retention. The Army's emergency created a need to withdraw troops and Ulsterise the conflict. Although this constrained the Labour government's ability to defend powersharing, the Army also appeared reluctant to support the government's conciliatory policy. The crisis of the British state over Northern Ireland (1972–76) provides part of the context in which allegations about the undermining of Prime Minister Harold Wilson and the Labour government in the 1970s should be considered.