Does economic policy uncertainty influence executive compensation stickiness? Firm-level evidence from China

IF 7.9 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Economic Analysis and Policy Pub Date : 2024-07-14 DOI:10.1016/j.eap.2024.07.006

Qiaoyu Jia , Jia'nan Zhou

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study conducts an empirical analysis of the effect of economic policy uncertainty on executive compensation stickiness and the underlying mechanism using data on A-share main board listed companies from 2007 to 2021. This study finds that economic policy uncertainty positively relates to executive compensation stickiness. Tolerance, information, and supervision effects are important mechanisms of this impact. Further studies show that the effect of economic policy uncertainty on executive compensation stickiness is also significantly affected by political uncertainty, industry competition, nature of property rights, executive career concerns, and management power.

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经济政策的不确定性会影响高管薪酬粘性吗？来自中国企业层面的证据

本研究利用 2007 年至 2021 年 A 股主板上市公司的数据，对经济政策不确定性对高管薪酬粘性的影响及其内在机制进行了实证分析。研究发现，经济政策不确定性与高管薪酬粘性正相关。容忍效应、信息效应和监督效应是这一影响的重要机制。进一步的研究表明，经济政策不确定性对高管薪酬粘性的影响还受到政治不确定性、行业竞争、产权性质、高管职业关切和管理层权力的显著影响。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Economic Analysis and Policy ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

9.80

自引率

9.20%

发文量

231

审稿时长

93 days

期刊介绍： Economic Analysis and Policy (established 1970) publishes articles from all branches of economics with a particular focus on research, theoretical and applied, which has strong policy relevance. The journal also publishes survey articles and empirical replications on key policy issues. Authors are expected to highlight the main insights in a non-technical introduction and in the conclusion.