{"title":"Antitrust regulation, innovation and industry dynamics","authors":"Shiyun Xia","doi":"10.1016/j.qref.2024.101881","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper presents a framework for identifying the impacts of antitrust regulation on innovation and industry dynamics. I consider two inventor types: multi-product incumbent firms and startups not yet in product markets. They pursue external innovation, which results in Schumpeterian competition; and internal innovation, which incumbent firms use to refine current products in their portfolios. I find that weaker regulation gives incumbent firms greater market power to block competition, reducing incentives for external innovation, but raising incentives for internal innovation. Less heavy-handed regulation slows industry dynamics and raises industrial concentration; however, more lenient regulation may increase aggregate innovation depending on parameter value.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47962,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1062976924000875","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper presents a framework for identifying the impacts of antitrust regulation on innovation and industry dynamics. I consider two inventor types: multi-product incumbent firms and startups not yet in product markets. They pursue external innovation, which results in Schumpeterian competition; and internal innovation, which incumbent firms use to refine current products in their portfolios. I find that weaker regulation gives incumbent firms greater market power to block competition, reducing incentives for external innovation, but raising incentives for internal innovation. Less heavy-handed regulation slows industry dynamics and raises industrial concentration; however, more lenient regulation may increase aggregate innovation depending on parameter value.
期刊介绍：
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (QREF) attracts and publishes high quality manuscripts that cover topics in the areas of economics, financial economics and finance. The subject matter may be theoretical, empirical or policy related. Emphasis is placed on quality, originality, clear arguments, persuasive evidence, intelligent analysis and clear writing. At least one Special Issue is published per year. These issues have guest editors, are devoted to a single theme and the papers have well known authors. In addition we pride ourselves in being able to provide three to four article "Focus" sections in most of our issues.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
