When banks become pure creditors: The effects of declining shareholding by Japanese banks on bank lending and firms’ risk-taking

IF 6.1 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Arito Ono , Katsushi Suzuki , Iichiro Uesugi
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Abstract

This study empirically examines the impact of an exogenous decrease in banks’ shareholding on bank loans and firms’ risk-taking, utilizing a regulatory change in Japan relating to banks’ shareholding as an instrument. We find that an exogenous reduction in a bank’s shareholding decreased the bank’s share of loans in the client firm’s total loans, while it increased the volatility of a firm’s return on assets. The reduction in a bank’s shareholding did not affect firm risk as perceived by equity investors or its borrowing terms. These findings are consistent with the prediction that banks hold equity claims over client firms to gain a competitive advantage, and are weakly compatible with the prediction that banks’ shareholding mitigates shareholder–creditor conflict.

当银行成为纯粹的债权人时:日本银行持股比例下降对银行贷款和企业风险承担的影响
本研究以日本有关银行持股的监管变化为工具,实证检验了银行持股量的外生减少对银行贷款和企业风险承担的影响。我们发现,银行持股量的外生减少会降低银行贷款在客户公司总贷款中的份额,同时会增加公司资产回报率的波动性。银行减持股份并不影响股票投资者眼中的公司风险或其借款条件。这些研究结果与银行持有客户公司的股权以获得竞争优势的预测相一致,与银行持股缓解股东与债权人冲突的预测不完全吻合。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.70
自引率
9.30%
发文量
78
审稿时长
34 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Financial Stability provides an international forum for rigorous theoretical and empirical macro and micro economic and financial analysis of the causes, management, resolution and preventions of financial crises, including banking, securities market, payments and currency crises. The primary focus is on applied research that would be useful in affecting public policy with respect to financial stability. Thus, the Journal seeks to promote interaction among researchers, policy-makers and practitioners to identify potential risks to financial stability and develop means for preventing, mitigating or managing these risks both within and across countries.
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