Governance of corporate social responsibility: a platform ecosystem perspective

IF 4.1 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS
Wenfang Lin, Yifeng Wang, Georges Samara, Jintao Lu
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Purpose

The sustainable development of the platform economy has been hindered by the absence and alienation of platform corporate social responsibility. Previous studies have mainly focused on the contents and governance models for platform corporate social responsibility. This study seeks to explore which strategy participants choose in the governance of platform corporate social responsibility and their influencing factors.

Design/methodology/approach

Using a platform ecosystem approach, a quadrilateral evolutionary game model was developed, and the stabilities of subjects’ behavioral strategies and their combinations in various scenarios were analyzed. Additionally, the effects of key parameters on the system’s evolutionary path were simulated.

Findings

The ideal steady state system is achieved when platform enterprises, complementors and consumers adopt positive strategies while the government adopts lax regulation. Moreover, the evolutionary strategies of the subjects are influenced by several factors, including the participation costs of governance, the rewards and punishments imposed by platform enterprises, as well as the reputational losses of platform enterprises and complementors due to media coverage.

Practical implications

This study offers insights into improving the governance effectiveness of platform corporate social responsibility for managers and practitioners.

Originality/value

This study contributes to existing literature by considering the rational orientation of platform ecosystem members and revealing the interaction mechanisms among members. Furthermore, this study combines collective action theory and reputation theory to clarify the influencing factors on members’ behaviors.

企业社会责任治理:平台生态系统视角
目的平台经济的可持续发展一直受到平台企业社会责任缺失和异化的阻碍。以往的研究主要关注平台企业社会责任的内容和治理模式。本研究旨在探讨参与者在平台企业社会责任治理中的策略选择及其影响因素。设计/方法/途径采用平台生态系统方法,建立了四边形演化博弈模型,分析了不同场景下主体行为策略及其组合的稳定性。研究结果当平台企业、互补者和消费者采取积极策略,而政府采取宽松监管时,系统达到理想的稳定状态。此外,主体的演化策略还受到多种因素的影响,包括治理的参与成本、平台企业的奖惩以及媒体报道导致的平台企业和补充者的声誉损失。此外,本研究结合集体行动理论和声誉理论,阐明了成员行为的影响因素。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.20
自引率
8.70%
发文量
126
期刊介绍: ■In-depth studies of major issues ■Operations management ■Financial management ■Motivation ■Entrepreneurship ■Problem solving and proactivity ■Serious management argument ■Strategy and policy issues ■Tactics for turning around company crises Management Decision, considered by many to be the best publication in its field, consistently offers thoughtful and provocative insights into current management practice. As such, its high calibre contributions from leading management philosophers and practitioners make it an invaluable resource in the aggressive and demanding trading climate of the Twenty-First Century.
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