{"title":"Intuition Is Not Enough","authors":"Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen","doi":"10.1163/18722636-12341521","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This comment discusses Branko Mitrović’s view of historical anti-realism and realism. It identifies several interpretative errors and philosophical infelicities in Mitrović’s account, in particular regarding colligation, and realism itself. It is suggested that the debate between the realist and the anti-realist pertains to the statuses attributed to scientific and historical claims. Provided that anti-realism is not general skepticism about them, the burden of proof to show that such notions as ‘real,’ ‘fact,’ and ‘counterpart’ contribute to the philosophical discussion about the statuses of the claims rests on the shoulders of the realist. Furthermore, the realist should establish that the historian’s colligations can be uniquely correct and yet independent of the historian. This comment also is a plea for a more measured and rigorous philosophy of historiography.</p>","PeriodicalId":43541,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","volume":"196 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of the Philosophy of History","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341521","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This comment discusses Branko Mitrović’s view of historical anti-realism and realism. It identifies several interpretative errors and philosophical infelicities in Mitrović’s account, in particular regarding colligation, and realism itself. It is suggested that the debate between the realist and the anti-realist pertains to the statuses attributed to scientific and historical claims. Provided that anti-realism is not general skepticism about them, the burden of proof to show that such notions as ‘real,’ ‘fact,’ and ‘counterpart’ contribute to the philosophical discussion about the statuses of the claims rests on the shoulders of the realist. Furthermore, the realist should establish that the historian’s colligations can be uniquely correct and yet independent of the historian. This comment also is a plea for a more measured and rigorous philosophy of historiography.
期刊介绍:
Philosophy of history is a rapidly expanding area. There is growing interest today in: what constitutes knowledge of the past, the ontology of past events, the relationship of language to the past, and the nature of representations of the past. These interests are distinct from – although connected with – contemporary epistemology, philosophy of science, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and aesthetics. Hence we need a distinct venue in which philosophers can explore these issues. Journal of the Philosophy of History provides such a venue. Ever since neo-Kantianism, philosophy of history has been central to all of philosophy, whether or not particular philosophers recognized its potential significance.