{"title":"Opting out of the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) and impact on practices’ performance","authors":"V. Tzortziou Brown, J. Hayre, J. Ford","doi":"10.1016/j.puhip.2024.100526","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><h3>Background</h3><p>Financial incentives are being increasingly adopted to help improve standards of care within general practice. However their effects on care quality are unclear. This study aimed to evaluate the impact of practices opting out of the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), a financial incentive scheme in UK general practice.</p></div><div><h3>Study design</h3><p>A retrospective before and after study of all practices in Tower Hamlets, east London.</p></div><div><h3>Methods</h3><p>Practices were given an option by local commissioners of opting out of QOF without a financial penalty and instead opting for a locally designed financial incentive scheme that promoted more holistic care. We compared those practices which opted out of QOF to those which continued. We used national, publicly available QOF achievement data from 2016/17 and 2017/18. We undertook a sub-analysis of 16 QOF indicators to better understand the impact of the intervention.</p></div><div><h3>Results</h3><p>Of the 36 practices in Tower Hamlets, 7 decided to continue with QOF and 29 opted out. The intervention resulted in a small but statistically significant reduction in the total QOF achievement scores of practices which opted out of QOF. The sub-analysis of 16 QOF indicators showed statistically significant reductions in most of achievement scores net of exceptions for the practices that opted out. The differences in performance between the two cohorts of practices became smaller when exceptions were included.</p></div><div><h3>Conclusions</h3><p>The removal of QOF financial incentives can result in a reduction in achievement of QOF-related indicators but the size of the effect seems to depend on the QOF exception rates. An alternative incentive scheme that promotes a more holistic approach to care seems to be welcomed by general practices.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":34141,"journal":{"name":"Public Health in Practice","volume":"8 ","pages":"Article 100526"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666535224000636/pdfft?md5=f454dff9ab652d528f3df093ced8ec7c&pid=1-s2.0-S2666535224000636-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Public Health in Practice","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666535224000636","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"PUBLIC, ENVIRONMENTAL & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Background
Financial incentives are being increasingly adopted to help improve standards of care within general practice. However their effects on care quality are unclear. This study aimed to evaluate the impact of practices opting out of the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), a financial incentive scheme in UK general practice.
Study design
A retrospective before and after study of all practices in Tower Hamlets, east London.
Methods
Practices were given an option by local commissioners of opting out of QOF without a financial penalty and instead opting for a locally designed financial incentive scheme that promoted more holistic care. We compared those practices which opted out of QOF to those which continued. We used national, publicly available QOF achievement data from 2016/17 and 2017/18. We undertook a sub-analysis of 16 QOF indicators to better understand the impact of the intervention.
Results
Of the 36 practices in Tower Hamlets, 7 decided to continue with QOF and 29 opted out. The intervention resulted in a small but statistically significant reduction in the total QOF achievement scores of practices which opted out of QOF. The sub-analysis of 16 QOF indicators showed statistically significant reductions in most of achievement scores net of exceptions for the practices that opted out. The differences in performance between the two cohorts of practices became smaller when exceptions were included.
Conclusions
The removal of QOF financial incentives can result in a reduction in achievement of QOF-related indicators but the size of the effect seems to depend on the QOF exception rates. An alternative incentive scheme that promotes a more holistic approach to care seems to be welcomed by general practices.