Compliance is far from standard: Relational conditions of access and exclusion in agriculture

Abstract

Regulatory regimes codify complex social objectives for agriculture, and judge producers' compliance relative to the resulting rules and standards. By combining Access Theory with Regulator-Intermediary-Target Theory, we frame farmers' compliance with agricultural rules and standards as a dynamic, relational product of social networks, rather than an asset that a farmer either has or lacks. To build these arguments, we compare four cases of governance over distinct social objectives sought from agricultural production: (1) legitimacy, examined through ongoing cannabis legalization in California; (2) safety, examined through the proliferation of microbial risk management into specialty crop agriculture in the United States; (3) organic, examined through the evolution of the US National Organic Program standards; and (4) fairness, examined through the fair trade movement and the split between Fair Trade International and Fair Trade USA. We find that farmers must continuously negotiate their compliance to maintain market access. Three key types of intermediaries participate in that negotiation: gatekeeping intermediaries who judge who shall pass, normative intermediaries who reify norms of ‘good’ as opposed to ‘bad’ farms and farmers, and facilitating intermediaries upon whom farmers depend to help them claim compliance. Our comparative analysis reveals novel insights into the network of social relations that shape who can comply and who cannot, which in turn determines who may participate in agriculture, in what ways, and for the sake of whom.