Exploring the impact of tenure arrangements and incentives on sustainable forest use: Evidence from a framed-field experiment in Ethiopia

IF 4 2区 农林科学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Yeshimebet Ayele Tegenie , Robert Sparrow , Erwin Bulte , Frans Bongers
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Abstract

The types of tenurial arrangements and incentives appropriate for the sustainable management of common pool resources (CPRs), such as forests, remain a topic of debate. In this study, we aim to (i) investigate the extraction level of forest resources under short and long-term property rights, and (ii) evaluate the effectiveness of introducing mechanisms that leverage reputation and feelings of guilt in promoting cooperation among CPR users with short-term property rights to reduce over-harvesting. We develop a simple theoretical model to predict the optimal extraction level of a shared forest resource and validate the predictions using data from a framed field experiment conducted in rural Ethiopia. Our findings demonstrate that extraction levels under short-term property rights are higher compared to long-term property rights, aligning with the model predictions. Leveraging reputation and feelings of guilt is effective in bridging the gap in extraction intensity between short- and long-term property rights. However, as implementing reputation requires reliable monitoring that can be costly and challenging in the study context, we propose extending the duration of property rights over shared forest resources as a preferred strategy for curtailing over-extraction.

探索权属安排和激励措施对可持续森林利用的影响:埃塞俄比亚框架实地试验的证据
对于森林等共有资源(CPR)的可持续管理而言,适合的保有权安排和激励措施类型仍是一个争论不休的话题。在本研究中,我们旨在(i)调查短期和长期产权下森林资源的开采水平,以及(ii)评估引入声誉和负罪感机制在促进拥有短期产权的共有资源使用者之间的合作以减少过度采伐的有效性。我们建立了一个简单的理论模型来预测共享森林资源的最佳采伐量,并利用在埃塞俄比亚农村地区进行的框架实地实验数据对预测结果进行了验证。我们的研究结果表明,与长期产权相比,短期产权下的采伐量更高,这与模型的预测一致。利用声誉和负罪感可以有效缩小短期产权和长期产权在开采强度上的差距。然而,由于实施声誉需要可靠的监测,而在研究背景下,监测成本高昂且具有挑战性,因此我们建议延长共享森林资源产权的期限,以此作为遏制过度采伐的首选策略。
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来源期刊
Forest Policy and Economics
Forest Policy and Economics 农林科学-林学
CiteScore
9.00
自引率
7.50%
发文量
148
审稿时长
21.9 weeks
期刊介绍: Forest Policy and Economics is a leading scientific journal that publishes peer-reviewed policy and economics research relating to forests, forested landscapes, forest-related industries, and other forest-relevant land uses. It also welcomes contributions from other social sciences and humanities perspectives that make clear theoretical, conceptual and methodological contributions to the existing state-of-the-art literature on forests and related land use systems. These disciplines include, but are not limited to, sociology, anthropology, human geography, history, jurisprudence, planning, development studies, and psychology research on forests. Forest Policy and Economics is global in scope and publishes multiple article types of high scientific standard. Acceptance for publication is subject to a double-blind peer-review process.
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