Irrealis expressions and modality: A response to von Prince, Krajinović, and Krifka

Abstract

Abstract:Von Prince, Krajinović, and Krifka (2022) argue that irrealis is a crosslinguistically legitimate semantic category, and they define it in terms of a domain encompassing both future possibility and counterfactuality. In this response, we argue that this definition is too narrow, because it excludes past and present possibility and necessity. We suggest instead that the correct characterization is that irrealis expressions correlate with quantification over possible worlds—or in simpler terms, with modality. We then ask a compositional question: do irrealis expressions signal the presence of modality contributed by other morphemes in the clause, or do they contribute modality themselves? Based on a comparison between the languages in von Prince et al.’s sample and preliminary data from Lutuv (Lautu) Chin (South Central Tibeto-Burman, formerly called Kuki-Chin), we suggest that the answer to this question may vary from one language to the next, thereby contributing to a richer picture of how modal meaning is reflected and encoded crosslinguistically.