{"title":"Managerial ability, political risk and political spending disclosure","authors":"Huilan Zhang, Jing Wang","doi":"10.1108/medar-06-2023-2030","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nPurpose\nWhile the determinants of voluntary political spending disclosure have been extensively studied in the literature, there remains a lack of clear evidence regarding the specific impacts of managerial ability and political risk on such disclosure. Thus, the purpose of this study is to shed light on whether and how managerial ability and political risk influence firms’ political spending disclosure.\n\n\nDesign/methodology/approach\nThis study uses a sample of 2,242 firm-year observations of S&P 500 companies between 2013 and 2021.\n\n\nFindings\nThis study finds that firms with high-ability managers generally disclose more information about political spending. This positive relationship between managerial ability and political spending disclosure holds even after conducting additional tests to address potential endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, this study finds that firms operating in high-risk political environments also exhibit a greater propensity to disclose information regarding their political spending. The results remain robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and political risk.\n\n\nPractical implications\nThis study suggests that when designing policy to motivate firms to disclose political spending information, policy makers need to be aware of the critical role of managerial ability and idiosyncratic political risk the firm faces. In addition, this study offers insights to shareholders, advocacy groups, regulators and academics interested in understanding the determinants of political spending disclosure.\n\n\nOriginality/value\nThis study is among the first to provide empirical evidence that political spending disclosure can be explained by managerial ability and political risk. In addition, this study complements the literature on the consequences of managerial ability and political risk. Focusing on voluntary political spending disclosure, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the factors shaping the overall corporate information environment.\n","PeriodicalId":3,"journal":{"name":"ACS Applied Electronic Materials","volume":" 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACS Applied Electronic Materials","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/medar-06-2023-2030","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"材料科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Purpose
While the determinants of voluntary political spending disclosure have been extensively studied in the literature, there remains a lack of clear evidence regarding the specific impacts of managerial ability and political risk on such disclosure. Thus, the purpose of this study is to shed light on whether and how managerial ability and political risk influence firms’ political spending disclosure.
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses a sample of 2,242 firm-year observations of S&P 500 companies between 2013 and 2021.
Findings
This study finds that firms with high-ability managers generally disclose more information about political spending. This positive relationship between managerial ability and political spending disclosure holds even after conducting additional tests to address potential endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, this study finds that firms operating in high-risk political environments also exhibit a greater propensity to disclose information regarding their political spending. The results remain robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and political risk.
Practical implications
This study suggests that when designing policy to motivate firms to disclose political spending information, policy makers need to be aware of the critical role of managerial ability and idiosyncratic political risk the firm faces. In addition, this study offers insights to shareholders, advocacy groups, regulators and academics interested in understanding the determinants of political spending disclosure.
Originality/value
This study is among the first to provide empirical evidence that political spending disclosure can be explained by managerial ability and political risk. In addition, this study complements the literature on the consequences of managerial ability and political risk. Focusing on voluntary political spending disclosure, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the factors shaping the overall corporate information environment.
期刊介绍:
ACS Applied Electronic Materials is an interdisciplinary journal publishing original research covering all aspects of electronic materials. The journal is devoted to reports of new and original experimental and theoretical research of an applied nature that integrate knowledge in the areas of materials science, engineering, optics, physics, and chemistry into important applications of electronic materials. Sample research topics that span the journal's scope are inorganic, organic, ionic and polymeric materials with properties that include conducting, semiconducting, superconducting, insulating, dielectric, magnetic, optoelectronic, piezoelectric, ferroelectric and thermoelectric.
Indexed/Abstracted:
Web of Science SCIE
Scopus
CAS
INSPEC
Portico