Marly Tatiana Celis Galvez, Vitezslav Titl, F. Schotanus
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
The misuse of bureaucratic discretion in public procurement risks political favoritism and corruption. Discretionary thresholds regulate this, with lenient rules below and strict oversight above these thresholds. We examine the impact of changes in these thresholds in the Czech Republic in 2012 and 2016 on discretion misuse and market competition, using bunching estimators, regression discontinuity, and comprehensive data on construction contracts, political ties, and firm productivity. Our findings show a concentration of contracts just below thresholds, both pre and post‐reforms. Reforms reallocating contract values to new thresholds reveal that limiting discretion lowers final contract prices, indicating increased efficiency. However, when discretion increases, final prices are unaffected. Efficiency gains are not seen in contracts awarded to politically connected firms, suggesting that political favoritism hinders market outcome improvements from stricter regulations.
期刊介绍:
Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance.
Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.