Regulating the sharing economy: The effects of day caps on short- and long-term rental markets and stakeholder outcomes

IF 9.5 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Patrick Gauß, Sonja Gensler, Michael Kortenhaus, Nadine Riedel, Andrea Schneider
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Abstract

Home sharing platforms have experienced a rapid growth over the last decade. Following negative publicity, many cities have started regulating the short-term rental market. Regulations often involve a cap on the number of days a property can be rented out on a short-term basis. We draw on rich data for short-term rentals on Airbnb and for the long-term rental market to examine the impact of short-term rental regulations with a day cap on various stakeholders: hosts, guests, the platform provider, and residents. Based on a difference-in-differences design, we document a sizable drop in Airbnb activity. Interestingly, not only targeted hosts (i.e., hosts with reservation days larger than the day cap), but also non-targeted hosts reduce their Airbnb activity. The reservation days of non-targeted hosts decrease between 26.27% and 51.89% depending on the treatment. Targeted hosts experience a similar decline. There is, nevertheless, significant non-compliance: more than one third of hosts do not comply with enacted short-term rental regulations. Additional analyses show that few properties are redirected from short-term rental to long-term rental use and that there is no significant drop in long-term rents. Drawing on a theoretical model, we tie the estimated effects to changes in stakeholders’ welfare: Regulations significantly reduce the welfare of hosts, and the loss ranges between 46.30% and 9.02%. The welfare loss of the platform provider is proportional to the loss of the hosts. Welfare of guests decreases moderately ranging between 4.5% to 4.1%. The welfare of residents increases minimal. These results question the effectiveness and desirability of the studied short-term rental regulations.

Abstract Image

规范共享经济:日上限对短期和长期租赁市场及利益相关者结果的影响
在过去十年中,房屋共享平台经历了快速发展。随着负面新闻的曝光,许多城市开始对短租市场进行监管。监管措施通常涉及对房产短期出租的天数设置上限。我们利用丰富的 Airbnb 短租数据和长期租赁市场数据,研究了设置天数上限的短租法规对不同利益相关者(房东、客人、平台提供商和居民)的影响。基于差异设计,我们记录了 Airbnb 活动的显著下降。有趣的是,不仅目标房东(即预订天数大于天数上限的房东),非目标房东也减少了他们的 Airbnb 活动。非目标房东的预订天数减少了 26.27% 到 51.89%,这取决于处理方式。目标房东也经历了类似的下降。尽管如此,仍然存在严重的违规现象:超过三分之一的房东没有遵守已颁布的短期租赁法规。其他分析表明,很少有房产从短期租赁转为长期租赁,长期租金也没有显著下降。根据理论模型,我们将估计效果与利益相关者的福利变化联系起来:法规大大降低了房东的福利,损失在 46.30% 到 9.02% 之间。平台提供商的福利损失与房东的损失成正比。客人的福利适度减少,幅度在 4.5% 至 4.1% 之间。住户的福利增长微乎其微。这些结果对所研究的短租法规的有效性和可取性提出了质疑。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
30.00
自引率
7.10%
发文量
82
期刊介绍: JAMS, also known as The Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, plays a crucial role in bridging the gap between scholarly research and practical application in the realm of marketing. Its primary objective is to study and enhance marketing practices by publishing research-driven articles. When manuscripts are submitted to JAMS for publication, they are evaluated based on their potential to contribute to the advancement of marketing science and practice.
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