Impact of ownership structure and cross-listing on the role of female audit committee financial experts in mitigating earnings management

IF 4.2 2区 哲学 Q2 BUSINESS
Bilal, Francisca Ezeani, Muhammad Usman, Bushra Komal, Ali Meftah Gerged
{"title":"Impact of ownership structure and cross-listing on the role of female audit committee financial experts in mitigating earnings management","authors":"Bilal,&nbsp;Francisca Ezeani,&nbsp;Muhammad Usman,&nbsp;Bushra Komal,&nbsp;Ali Meftah Gerged","doi":"10.1111/beer.12705","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study investigates whether female Audit Committee Financial Experts (ACFEs) at Chinese listed companies reduce earnings management by examining their influence under different ownership structures and cross-listing scenarios. Our findings reveal that female ACFEs negatively affect earnings management, with their impact varying by ownership type. Specifically, female ACFEs in privately owned enterprises (non-SOEs) are more effective at reducing earnings management than those in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Furthermore, our analysis indicates that female ACFEs in cross-listed firms are better at mitigating earnings management compared with their counterparts in domestically listed firms. These results have significant implications for regulators, market authorities, investors, and corporate managers, highlighting the crucial role of female ACFEs in improving corporate transparency across diverse ownership frameworks and cross-listing conditions.</p>","PeriodicalId":29886,"journal":{"name":"Business Ethics the Environment & Responsibility","volume":"34 4","pages":"1171-1187"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/beer.12705","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Business Ethics the Environment & Responsibility","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/beer.12705","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study investigates whether female Audit Committee Financial Experts (ACFEs) at Chinese listed companies reduce earnings management by examining their influence under different ownership structures and cross-listing scenarios. Our findings reveal that female ACFEs negatively affect earnings management, with their impact varying by ownership type. Specifically, female ACFEs in privately owned enterprises (non-SOEs) are more effective at reducing earnings management than those in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Furthermore, our analysis indicates that female ACFEs in cross-listed firms are better at mitigating earnings management compared with their counterparts in domestically listed firms. These results have significant implications for regulators, market authorities, investors, and corporate managers, highlighting the crucial role of female ACFEs in improving corporate transparency across diverse ownership frameworks and cross-listing conditions.

所有权结构和交叉上市对女性审计委员会财务专家在缓解收益管理方面作用的影响
本研究通过考察女性审计委员会财务专家在不同所有权结构和交叉上市情况下的影响,探讨中国上市公司的女性审计委员会财务专家是否会减少收益管理。我们的研究结果表明,女性审计委员会财务专家对收益管理有负面影响,其影响因所有制类型而异。具体而言,私营企业(非国有企业)中的女性全职财务总监比国有企业(国有企业)中的女性全职财务总监更能有效地减少收益管理。此外,我们的分析表明,与国内上市公司的女性全职财务总监相比,交叉上市公司的女性全职财务总监在减少收益管理方面更有优势。这些结果对监管机构、市场主管机构、投资者和企业管理者具有重要意义,凸显了女性全职财务总监在不同所有权框架和交叉上市条件下提高企业透明度的关键作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
5.20
自引率
19.00%
发文量
86
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信