Refinancing cross-subsidies in the mortgage market

IF 10.4 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-04 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103876

Jack Fisher , Alessandro Gavazza , Lu Liu , Tarun Ramadorai , Jagdish Tripathy

引用次数: 0

Abstract

In household finance markets, inactive households can implicitly cross-subsidize active households who promptly respond to financial incentives. We assess the magnitude and distribution of cross-subsidies in the mortgage market. To do so, we build a structural model of household mortgage refinancing and estimate it on rich administrative data covering the stock of outstanding mortgages in the UK. We estimate sizeable cross-subsidies that flow from relatively poorer households and those located in less-wealthy areas towards richer households and those located in wealthier areas. Our work highlights how the design of household finance markets can contribute to wealth inequality.

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抵押贷款市场中的再融资交叉补贴

在家庭金融市场中，不活跃的家庭可以暗中交叉补贴那些对金融激励措施迅速做出反应的活跃家庭。我们对抵押贷款市场中交叉补贴的规模和分布进行了评估。为此，我们建立了一个家庭抵押贷款再融资的结构模型，并利用涵盖英国未偿抵押贷款存量的丰富行政数据对其进行了估算。我们估计，从相对较贫困的家庭和位于较不富裕地区的家庭流向较富裕的家庭和位于较富裕地区的家庭的交叉补贴规模巨大。我们的研究突显了家庭金融市场的设计是如何导致财富不平等的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

15.80

自引率

4.50%

发文量

192

审稿时长

37 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.