Firm-level political risk and bank loan contracting

IF 3.2 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI:10.1111/1911-3846.12951

Walid Saffar, Yang Wang, K. C. John Wei

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We investigate the impact of firm-level political risk on loan contracting. We find that firm-level political risk is positively associated with bank loan cost and that this effect is stronger for firms experiencing increased operational uncertainty and higher default risks. Firm-level political risk also leads to more unfavorable non-pricing loan terms. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we use an instrumental variable approach and placebo tests. We further find that political connections and relationship-based borrowing can attenuate the adverse effect of firm-level political risk on loan contracting.

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公司层面的政治风险和银行贷款契约

我们研究了企业层面的政治风险对贷款签约的影响。我们发现，企业层面的政治风险与银行贷款成本呈正相关，而且对于经营不确定性增加和违约风险较高的企业来说，这种影响更大。公司层面的政治风险还会导致更不利的非定价贷款条款。为了缓解内生性问题，我们使用了工具变量方法和安慰剂测试。我们进一步发现，政治关系和基于关系的借贷可以减弱公司层面的政治风险对贷款合同的不利影响。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Contemporary Accounting Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

6.20

自引率

11.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： Contemporary Accounting Research (CAR) is the premiere research journal of the Canadian Academic Accounting Association, which publishes leading- edge research that contributes to our understanding of all aspects of accounting"s role within organizations, markets or society. Canadian based, increasingly global in scope, CAR seeks to reflect the geographical and intellectual diversity in accounting research. To accomplish this, CAR will continue to publish in its traditional areas of excellence, while seeking to more fully represent other research streams in its pages, so as to continue and expand its tradition of excellence.