Robust auctions with affiliated private values

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-05-28 DOI:10.1007/s10058-024-00354-0

Yangwei Song

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study auctions in an affiliated private value framework in which buyers face ambiguity over the distribution of the others’ valuations and make choices that are robust to that ambiguity. We show that, in contrast to the Bayesian case, a first-price auction can generate a higher revenue than a second-price auction in the presence of ambiguity. We also extend this insight to large double auctions. In particular, we propose a pay-as-bid double auction mechanism and demonstrate that given any nontrivial amount of ambiguity, this mechanism implements the efficient trade and is ex-post budget balanced with probability one as the market size grows.

Abstract Image

查看原文本刊更多论文

具有附属私人价值的稳健拍卖

我们在隶属私人价值框架下研究拍卖，在该框架下，买方面临他人估值分布的模糊性，并做出对这种模糊性稳健的选择。我们的研究表明，与贝叶斯情况相反，在存在模糊性的情况下，第一价格拍卖可以比第二价格拍卖产生更高的收益。我们还将这一见解推广到大型双重拍卖中。特别是，我们提出了一种按出价付费的双重拍卖机制，并证明在任何非数量的模糊性条件下，这种机制都能实现有效交易，而且随着市场规模的扩大，事后预算平衡的概率为 1。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Review of Economic Design ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

28.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Review of Economic Design comprises the creative art and science of inventing, analyzing and testing economic as well as social and political institutions and mechanisms aimed at achieving individual objectives and social goals. In this age of Economic Design, the accumulated traditions and wealth of knowledge in normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory are applied with novel ideas in the creative tasks of designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. These include constitutions and other assignments of rights, mechanisms for allocation or regulation, tax and incentive schemes, contract forms, voting and other choice aggregation procedures, markets, auctions, organizational forms, such as partnerships, together with supporting membership and other property rights, and information systems. These designs, the methods of analysis used in their scrutiny, as well as the mathematical techniques and empirical knowledge they employ, along with comparative assessments of the performance of known economic systems and implemented designs, all of these form natural components of the subject matter of Economic Design. Officially cited as: Rev Econ Design