Is ambiguity aversion a preference? Ambiguity aversion without asymmetric information

IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Daniel L. Chen
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Ambiguity aversion is the interpretation of the experimental finding (the Ellsberg paradox) that most subjects prefer betting on events whose probabilities are known (objective) to betting on events whose probabilities are unknown (subjective). However in typical experiments these unknown probabilities are known by others. Thus the typical Ellsberg experiment is a situation of asymmetric information. People may try to avoid situations where they are the less informed party, which is normatively appropriate. We find that eliminating asymmetric information in the Ellsberg experiment while leaving ambiguity in place, makes subjects prefer the ambiguous bet over the objective one, reversing the prior results.

模糊厌恶是一种偏好吗?没有不对称信息的模糊厌恶
模糊厌恶是对实验发现(埃尔斯伯格悖论)的解释,即大多数受试者更喜欢对概率已知(客观)的事件下注,而不是对概率未知(主观)的事件下注。然而,在典型的实验中,这些未知概率是被其他人知道的。因此,典型的埃尔斯伯格实验就是一种信息不对称的情况。人们可能会尽量避免自己是信息不对称的一方,这在规范上是合适的。我们发现,消除埃尔斯伯格实验中的信息不对称,同时保留模棱两可的情况,会使受试者更喜欢模棱两可的赌注,而不是客观的赌注,这与之前的结果正好相反。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
12.50%
发文量
113
审稿时长
83 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly the Journal of Socio-Economics) welcomes submissions that deal with various economic topics but also involve issues that are related to other social sciences, especially psychology, or use experimental methods of inquiry. Thus, contributions in behavioral economics, experimental economics, economic psychology, and judgment and decision making are especially welcome. The journal is open to different research methodologies, as long as they are relevant to the topic and employed rigorously. Possible methodologies include, for example, experiments, surveys, empirical work, theoretical models, meta-analyses, case studies, and simulation-based analyses. Literature reviews that integrate findings from many studies are also welcome, but they should synthesize the literature in a useful manner and provide substantial contribution beyond what the reader could get by simply reading the abstracts of the cited papers. In empirical work, it is important that the results are not only statistically significant but also economically significant. A high contribution-to-length ratio is expected from published articles and therefore papers should not be unnecessarily long, and short articles are welcome. Articles should be written in a manner that is intelligible to our generalist readership. Book reviews are generally solicited but occasionally unsolicited reviews will also be published. Contact the Book Review Editor for related inquiries.
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