Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-20 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.010

Di Feng , Bettina Klaus , Flip Klijn

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Abstract

We consider the generalization of the classical Shapley and Scarf housing market model (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) to so-called multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995). Throughout the paper, we focus on strict preferences. When preferences are separable, the prominent solution for these markets is the typewise top-trading-cycles (tTTC) mechanism.

We first show that for lexicographic preferences, a mechanism is unanimous (or onto), individually rational, strategy-proof, and non-bossy if and only if it is the tTTC mechanism. Second, we obtain a corresponding characterization for separable preferences. We obtain additional characterizations when replacing [strategy-proofness and non-bossiness] with self-enforcing group (or pairwise) strategy-proofness. Finally, we show that for strict preferences, there is no mechanism satisfying unanimity, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.

Our characterizations of the tTTC mechanism constitute the first characterizations of an extension of the prominent top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism to multiple-type housing markets.

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多类型住房市场的类型化顶部交易-周期机制特征

我们考虑将经典的 Shapley 和 Scarf 住房市场模型（Shapley 和 Scarf，1974 年）推广到所谓的多类型住房市场（Moulin，1995 年）。在本文中，我们始终关注严格偏好。我们首先证明，对于词法偏好，如果且仅当一个机制是 tTTC 机制时，该机制才是一致的（或对等的）、个体理性的、防策略的和非老板的。其次，我们得到了可分离偏好的相应特征。如果把[策略证明性和非老板性]替换为自我强化的群体（或成对）策略证明性，我们还能得到其他特征。最后，我们证明了对于严格偏好，不存在满足一致性、个体理性和策略防弊性的机制。我们对 tTTC 机制的描述是对著名的顶层交易循环（TTC）机制扩展到多类型住房市场的首次描述。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology