Reflections of the EU Normative Agenda toward First and Second Russia-Chechen Conflicts

Abstract

Over the decades, the normative approach has been considered as the decisive external policy gear of the EU. But, the limitation of the policy divulges its future application to an external country, promoting the question: Is the EU a normative power, or has it failed to implement its normative policy towards an external country? This paper aims to analyze the normative strategy of the EU and its constraints during the first and second Russia-Chechen conflicts. It investigated the EU normative policy regarding the conflicts and revealed the strategic chemistry of the EU-Russia relation, which fluctuated from time to time. It argues the EU normative discourses toward conflicts were sporadic in character and consisted of verbal and, at best, some written criticisms occasionally. Predominantly, The EU largely disregards the application of its normative values to the Chechen case; instead, it prioritizes its economic and bilateral relations with Russia. However, the 9/11 incident in the USA and the post 9/11 Russian hostage crisis developed the EU normative policy as a less important policy for Chechen conflicts.