An Analysis of the Debate between al-Tūsī and al-Kātibī on Contingency Argument

Mehmet Tayfun Küçük
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Abstract

This article addresses a written debate between Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 675 AH/1277 AD) and Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672 AH/1274 AD) on the contingency argument, which is one of the most well-known proofs offered in history regarding the existence of God. According to thinkers before al-Kātibī, the contingency argument verifies the Necessary Being, and then it debunks the possibility of infinite regress. By “earlier thinkers,” al-Kātibī means especially Avicenna (d. 428 AH/1037 AD) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210). According to al-Kātibī, the notion of the Necessary Being was proved through the contingency argument they put forward, but a careful examination of their arguments indicates that they presented no definitive proof refuting the notion of infinite regress. Therefore, according to al-Kātibī, what Avicenna and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī claimed to prove the impossibility of infinite regress through the contingency argument is not valid. As al-Tūsī responded to al-Kātibī’s objections, a debate consisting of three letters from each side emerged between them. At the end of the debate, al-Kātibī found al-Tūsī’s explanations reasonable, and he admitted that they were correct. However, the parties did not mention the agreed version of the argument at the end of the debate. For this reason, I added this agreed argument at the end of this study in accordance with the parties’ declarations. The purpose of the present study is to analyse this debate in its natural order and to eliminate technical ambiguities it involves, defending Avicenna’s, al-Rāzī’s, and al-Tūsī’s philosophical position in the contingency argument about proving the impossibility of infinite regress through the argument. On the other hand, this debate is an epitome of the classical debate tradition. It is also significant in the sense that it reveals one of the best examples of the interdisciplinary discussion between kalām and philosophical schools, and the application of classical logic to theoretical disciplines. As a result of our analyses of the debate, we have concluded that the objections brought by al-Kātibī against the contingency argument in parallel with the conclusion of the debate accepted by the parties, maintain the contingency argument. According to this conclusion, the contingency argument is a proof which invalidates infinite regress while proving the existence of the Necessary Being.
图西与卡蒂比关于权变论证的辩论分析
本文论述了 Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī(卒于伊斯兰历 675 年/公元 1277 年)和 Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī(卒于伊斯兰历 672 年/公元 1274 年)之间关于或然性论证的书面辩论。根据 al-Kātibī 之前的思想家的观点,或然性论证验证了必然性存在,然后又推翻了无限倒退的可能性。al-Kātibī所说的 "早期思想家 "主要指阿维森纳(Avicenna,卒于伊斯兰历 428 年/1037 年)和法克尔-阿尔丁-拉齐(Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī,卒于伊斯兰历 606 年/1210 年)。根据 al-Kātibī,"必然存在 "的概念是通过他们提出的或然性论证证明的,但仔细研究他们的论证后发现,他们并没有提出反驳无限倒退概念的确切证据。因此,根据 al-Kātibī,阿维森纳和 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī 所声称的通过或然性论证来证明无限倒退的不可能性是不成立的。在 al-Tūsī 回应 al-Kātibī 的反对意见时,他们之间展开了一场辩论,双方各写了三封信。辩论结束时,al-Kātibī 认为 al-Tūsī 的解释合理,并承认这些解释是正确的。然而,双方在辩论结束时并未提及辩论的商定版本。因此,根据双方的声明,我在本研究报告的最后添加了这一商定的论点。本研究的目的是按其自然顺序分析这场辩论,并消除其中涉及的技术性歧义,为阿维森纳、拉齐和图西在或然论证中关于通过论证证明无限倒退不可能的哲学立场进行辩护。另一方面,这场辩论是古典辩论传统的缩影。它的意义还在于,它揭示了卡拉姆与哲学流派之间跨学科讨论的最佳范例之一,以及古典逻辑在理论学科中的应用。通过对辩论的分析,我们得出结论:卡蒂比针对或然性论证提出的反对意见与各方接受的辩论结论并行不悖,维持了或然性论证。根据这一结论,或然性论证是一种证明,它在证明必然存在者存在的同时,也使无限倒退失效。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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