Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-13 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.003

Nabil Afodjo , Roland Pongou

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies, where each agent only cares about trading with a desired number of partners from the opposite side. For both homogeneous and heterogeneous economies, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition that ensures the efficiency of all pairwise stable matchings. In addition, we provide a sufficient condition for maximality in heterogeneous economies. These conditions have implications for the design of anonymous markets that function optimally without the continuous intervention of a social planner.

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匿名双面经济中的效率与最大化

我们研究了匿名双面经济中的效率和最大化问题，在匿名双面经济中，每个代理人只关心与对立面所需的伙伴数量进行交易。对于同质经济和异质经济，我们都提供了一个必要条件和充分条件，以确保所有配对稳定匹配的效率。此外，我们还为异质经济中的最大化提供了充分条件。这些条件对设计无需社会规划者持续干预就能实现最佳功能的匿名市场具有重要意义。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology