The Influence of Lobbies: Analyzing Group Consensus from a Physics Approach

Abstract

In this paper, we study the influence of a small group of agents (i.e., a lobby) that is trying to spread a rumor in a population by using the known model proposed by Serge Galam. In particular, lobbies are modeled as subgroups of individuals who strategically choose their seating in the social space in order to protect their opinions and influence others. We consider different social gatherings and simulate, using finite Markovian chains, opinion dynamics by comparing situations with a lobby to those without a lobby. Our results show how the lobby can influence opinion dynamics in terms of the prevailing opinion and the mean time to reach unanimity. The approach that we take overcomes some of the problems that behavioral economics and psychology have recently struggled with in terms of replicability. This approach is related to the methodological revolution that is slowly changing the dominant perspective in psychology.