{"title":"Justification for coercion in a public health crisis: not just a matter of individual harm.","authors":"Lucie White","doi":"10.1007/s40592-024-00196-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The COVID pandemic was an exceptional public health situation - which brought with it unprecedented restrictions across the global populace. But what was it about this pandemic which caused us to implement such drastic restrictions on liberty? Much of the ethical debate on restrictive measures such as lockdowns and vaccine requirements focused on the potential harm that individuals cause to other individuals by the risk of infection. I will suggest that this may come from a reliance on J.S. Mill's harm principle as providing the ultimate justification for coercion - i.e., the well-accepted principle that state coercion is justified in order to prevent the imposition of unacceptable risk of harm to others. Though there have been attempts, in the wider public health ethics literature, to use the harm principle as a basis for restricting contribution to collective harms, I will suggest that these attempts cannot rely on the harm principle alone. I will then turn to the ways in which an individual-based line of reasoning does not capture a distinctive sort of harm posed by the COVID pandemic (and others like it): the potential failure of healthcare systems. I will draw out three ways in which a focus on the harm that an individual poses to another individual fails to capture the full scope of harm wrought by the collapse of healthcare systems. First, it can't adequately capture the cumulative and \"looping effects\" of the harm caused by strained healthcare systems. Second, it fails to capture the widespread ripple effects the failure of a central societal institution can have on other institutions. And third, the failure of a healthcare system can impose \"psychic costs\", affecting the moral character of all members of society, reducing trust in institutions, and potentially posing an existential threat to the fabric of society. Finally, I will sketch some implications of the recognition of this distinctive sort of harm for the justification of coercive public health measures.</p>","PeriodicalId":43628,"journal":{"name":"Monash Bioethics Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Monash Bioethics Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-024-00196-0","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The COVID pandemic was an exceptional public health situation - which brought with it unprecedented restrictions across the global populace. But what was it about this pandemic which caused us to implement such drastic restrictions on liberty? Much of the ethical debate on restrictive measures such as lockdowns and vaccine requirements focused on the potential harm that individuals cause to other individuals by the risk of infection. I will suggest that this may come from a reliance on J.S. Mill's harm principle as providing the ultimate justification for coercion - i.e., the well-accepted principle that state coercion is justified in order to prevent the imposition of unacceptable risk of harm to others. Though there have been attempts, in the wider public health ethics literature, to use the harm principle as a basis for restricting contribution to collective harms, I will suggest that these attempts cannot rely on the harm principle alone. I will then turn to the ways in which an individual-based line of reasoning does not capture a distinctive sort of harm posed by the COVID pandemic (and others like it): the potential failure of healthcare systems. I will draw out three ways in which a focus on the harm that an individual poses to another individual fails to capture the full scope of harm wrought by the collapse of healthcare systems. First, it can't adequately capture the cumulative and "looping effects" of the harm caused by strained healthcare systems. Second, it fails to capture the widespread ripple effects the failure of a central societal institution can have on other institutions. And third, the failure of a healthcare system can impose "psychic costs", affecting the moral character of all members of society, reducing trust in institutions, and potentially posing an existential threat to the fabric of society. Finally, I will sketch some implications of the recognition of this distinctive sort of harm for the justification of coercive public health measures.
期刊介绍:
Monash Bioethics Review provides comprehensive coverage of traditional topics and emerging issues in bioethics. The Journal is especially concerned with empirically-informed philosophical bioethical analysis with policy relevance. Monash Bioethics Review also regularly publishes empirical studies providing explicit ethical analysis and/or with significant ethical or policy implications. Produced by the Monash University Centre for Human Bioethics since 1981 (originally as Bioethics News), Monash Bioethics Review is the oldest peer reviewed bioethics journal based in Australia–and one of the oldest bioethics journals in the world.
An international forum for empirically-informed philosophical bioethical analysis with policy relevance.
Includes empirical studies providing explicit ethical analysis and/or with significant ethical or policy implications.
One of the oldest bioethics journals, produced by a world-leading bioethics centre.
Publishes papers up to 13,000 words in length.
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