The company you keep: Renegotiations and adverse selection in transportation infrastructure

IF 2.2 3区 工程技术 Q2 ECONOMICS
Eduardo Engel , Ronald D. Fischer , Alexander Galetovic
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study the effects of a country’s propensity to renegotiate transportation infrastructure contracts on the technical efficiency of the firms they attract. Firms are characterized by their ability to lobby and by their technical efficiency. In equilibrium, countries with a higher propensity to renegotiate contracts attract less efficient firms, that are better at renegotiating. This leads to costlier transportation infrastructure and lower welfare. Countries with institutional settings with a higher propensity for renegotiation, or where more net welfare is “up for grabs” in renegotiations, procure transportation infrastructure at a higher cost. We provide anecdotal evidence of the link between renegotiation in public procurement and a firm’s ability to renegotiate contracts.

你的同伴运输基础设施中的重新谈判和逆向选择
我们研究了一个国家重新谈判交通基础设施合同的倾向对其吸引的企业技术效率的影响。企业的特点是其游说能力和技术效率。在均衡状态下,重新谈判合同倾向较高的国家吸引的企业效率较低,而重新谈判能力较强的企业效率较高。这导致运输基础设施成本增加,福利降低。在制度环境中,重新谈判倾向较高的国家,或在重新谈判中 "争夺 "净福利较多的国家,采购交通基础设施的成本较高。我们提供了公共采购中重新谈判与公司重新谈判合同能力之间联系的传闻证据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.50
自引率
7.10%
发文量
19
审稿时长
69 days
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