“Everyone has interests”: A red herring

IF 3 4区 环境科学与生态学 Q2 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES
Gunilla Öberg, Martin Scheringer
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What a COI does indicate is that it is inappropriate to participate in certain decisions because we have <i>a competing interest that risks influencing our ability to provide advice that aligns with the interests of the organization we are to advise</i> (Moore et al., <span>2005</span>). Conflict-of-Interest policies help us stay on course because we commonly underestimate when our interests unduly impact our judgment, overestimate our ability to be neutral, and tend to ignore all the gray zones that are challenging to navigate (Chugh et al., <span>2005</span>). This is why COI policies need to be carefully carved out and regularly reviewed—in light of the organization's mission and values. If COIs are improperly defined or managed, there is a serious risk that the reputation of the people involved and the organization will be called into question. Rigorous COI policies are necessary to protect not only the decisions to be made but also the integrity of the organization. They are essential when it comes to policies that impact the health and well-being of many people. This is why it is crucial that a rigorous COI policy is developed for the proposed Intergovernmental Science−Policy Panel on Chemicals, Waste, and Pollution Prevention (SPP) (UN Environment Programme, <span>2024</span>), as discussed in our previous paper (Schäffer et al., <span>2023</span>).</p><p>A common response to COI debates is “… but everyone has interests.” This is, however, a red herring. Everyone, indeed, has interests. Interests and values are innate to every person (Douglas, <span>2021</span>; Elliott, <span>2017</span>). We need to be clear over our values and engage in discussions about whether or not our values and research align with societal goals. Notably, an interest does not automatically lead to a COI, and it is crucial to recognize what's what (Bero &amp; Grundy, <span>2016</span>). Craving a reputation, for example, doesn't automatically lead to a COI: It only does so if the reputation that one craves stands in conflict with the interest of the organization that one is to advise. The goal of the SPP is to <i>contribute further to the sound management of chemicals and waste and to prevent pollution</i> (UN Environment Programme, <span>2024</span>). A common argument is that researchers who are fond of the limelight have a COI, because—the argument goes—this interest incentivizes them to design their studies such that the results show adverse effects of chemicals of concern, as alarmist results give headlines. This is undeniably an example of bad research and it would be unwise to have a person who conducts research of poor quality provide advice to the panel. But it is not an example of COI. Their interest is to be in the limelight, and it is not a given that wanting to be in the limelight conflicts with the interest of the panel. If the research is of high quality, it will likely be of value to the panel, in spite of the person seeking the limelight.</p><p>The claim that “we all have interests” stems from a conflation of COIs with the fact that we all have different interests, values, and preferences. It is increasingly recognized that diverse research teams reduce the risk of biased studies as they fester in homogeneous communities (Hofstra et al., <span>2020</span>; Nielsen et al., <span>2017</span>). Notably, scientific controversies born out of diverging nonfinancial interests are legitimate and a strength as they help us sort out important value-laden questions such as: What should we study? Why this and not that? What kind of data are relevant? How does the method impact the outcome? Who might benefit from this type of study? Might our research lead to unequal distribution of harm? Importantly, having a vested interest in a particular theory or method does <i>not</i> lead to a COI for an expert advisor. When it comes to chemical risk, there are plenty of scientific controversies, not least because it is a highly complex field, and there is no lack of scientists who are married to a particular theory or method. So, if the expert advisors are too homogeneous, there is a risk that relevant perspectives are excluded. It is essential to remember that this is not because the experts have COIs. It's because of not having sufficiently thought through which factors matter to ensure that the panel has adequate diversity regarding relevant epistemic perspectives.</p><p>Let's move from having a vested interest in a particular theory or method to having a financial conflict of interest. It goes without saying that a CEO for a company whose bottom line depends on a chemical should not be involved in regulatory decisions regarding that chemical as said CEO has the responsibility to tend to the financial bottom line and see to the interests of shareholders and employees. These are clearly competing interests. Even high-quality research produced by this company will fall under COI because the CEO, the board alongside managers, and others in the company with power to decide what is shared and how <i>have a legal obligation to care for their employees and shareholders</i>. It also seems reasonable that a researcher whose research depends on funding from said company should be required to recuse themselves, as this also is a clear competing interest. But the gray zones are large. For example, should an expert be allowed to have many shares in said company? What about a scientist working in a consulting laboratory with this company as their primary client? This is challenging terrain to navigate, and it requires thoughtful and careful deliberation, clear rules, and transparent communication.</p><p>We have heard through the scuttlebutt that some feel that our paper is an <i>ad hominem</i> attack on industry scientists, absolving academics. However, the paper's central claim is <i>not</i> that academics are more virtuous or have higher moral standards than scientists working in the private sector. There are people with questionable moral compasses in all sectors. The core claim is that the effectiveness of the proposed panel depends on the trust that it enjoys. In the case of the SPP, this is important not least because of the tarred reputation of the chemical industry caused by the scandalous behavior of certain individuals and industries (Michaels, <span>2008</span>; Oreskes &amp; Conway, <span>2010</span>). To demonstrate good intentions and alignment with the SPP's goals, it lies in the industry's interest to support clear COI rules and transparent communication, as these are key to retaining public trust not only in the advice coming out of the SPP but also in the industry.</p><p>Notably, an increasing number of companies explicitly align their mission and vision with that of the panel as they strive to utilize green(er) principles, provide safer alternatives for essential products containing chemicals of concern, and prevent waste generation. This is very promising. To support this commendable work, we need a strong SPP, which requires clear and strict COI policies, transparency, and regular audits (Ågerstrand et al., <span>2023</span>), as well as a clear understanding of the difference between legitimate interests and COIs. Pollution caused by synthetic substances has exceeded the planetary boundaries (Richardson et al., <span>2023</span>), and we need to find ways to manage these sustainably. We cannot afford a toothless SPP, which it will be if it's not widely seen as rigorous and free from manipulation.</p><p><b>Gunilla Öberg</b>: Conceptualization; investigation; writing—original draft. <b>Martin Scheringer</b>: Writing—review and editing.</p><p>The authors declare no conflicts of interest.</p>","PeriodicalId":13557,"journal":{"name":"Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management","volume":"20 4","pages":"1193-1195"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/ieam.4938","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management","FirstCategoryId":"93","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ieam.4938","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"环境科学与生态学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Our recent paper in Environmental Science & Technology, "Conflicts of interest in the assessment of chemicals, waste, and pollution" (Schäffer et al., 2023), has received considerable attention. That's good. Wise management of chemicals and waste is a topic that needs serious and thoughtful debate.

Feedback from readers of our paper suggests that the term conflict-of-interest (COI) comes with negative connotations. This is unfortunate. It's apparently a common impression that the mere existence of a COI indicates wrongdoing. It doesn't. As expert advisors, our primary interest should be to serve the interests of the organization that we are advising. What a COI does indicate is that it is inappropriate to participate in certain decisions because we have a competing interest that risks influencing our ability to provide advice that aligns with the interests of the organization we are to advise (Moore et al., 2005). Conflict-of-Interest policies help us stay on course because we commonly underestimate when our interests unduly impact our judgment, overestimate our ability to be neutral, and tend to ignore all the gray zones that are challenging to navigate (Chugh et al., 2005). This is why COI policies need to be carefully carved out and regularly reviewed—in light of the organization's mission and values. If COIs are improperly defined or managed, there is a serious risk that the reputation of the people involved and the organization will be called into question. Rigorous COI policies are necessary to protect not only the decisions to be made but also the integrity of the organization. They are essential when it comes to policies that impact the health and well-being of many people. This is why it is crucial that a rigorous COI policy is developed for the proposed Intergovernmental Science−Policy Panel on Chemicals, Waste, and Pollution Prevention (SPP) (UN Environment Programme, 2024), as discussed in our previous paper (Schäffer et al., 2023).

A common response to COI debates is “… but everyone has interests.” This is, however, a red herring. Everyone, indeed, has interests. Interests and values are innate to every person (Douglas, 2021; Elliott, 2017). We need to be clear over our values and engage in discussions about whether or not our values and research align with societal goals. Notably, an interest does not automatically lead to a COI, and it is crucial to recognize what's what (Bero & Grundy, 2016). Craving a reputation, for example, doesn't automatically lead to a COI: It only does so if the reputation that one craves stands in conflict with the interest of the organization that one is to advise. The goal of the SPP is to contribute further to the sound management of chemicals and waste and to prevent pollution (UN Environment Programme, 2024). A common argument is that researchers who are fond of the limelight have a COI, because—the argument goes—this interest incentivizes them to design their studies such that the results show adverse effects of chemicals of concern, as alarmist results give headlines. This is undeniably an example of bad research and it would be unwise to have a person who conducts research of poor quality provide advice to the panel. But it is not an example of COI. Their interest is to be in the limelight, and it is not a given that wanting to be in the limelight conflicts with the interest of the panel. If the research is of high quality, it will likely be of value to the panel, in spite of the person seeking the limelight.

The claim that “we all have interests” stems from a conflation of COIs with the fact that we all have different interests, values, and preferences. It is increasingly recognized that diverse research teams reduce the risk of biased studies as they fester in homogeneous communities (Hofstra et al., 2020; Nielsen et al., 2017). Notably, scientific controversies born out of diverging nonfinancial interests are legitimate and a strength as they help us sort out important value-laden questions such as: What should we study? Why this and not that? What kind of data are relevant? How does the method impact the outcome? Who might benefit from this type of study? Might our research lead to unequal distribution of harm? Importantly, having a vested interest in a particular theory or method does not lead to a COI for an expert advisor. When it comes to chemical risk, there are plenty of scientific controversies, not least because it is a highly complex field, and there is no lack of scientists who are married to a particular theory or method. So, if the expert advisors are too homogeneous, there is a risk that relevant perspectives are excluded. It is essential to remember that this is not because the experts have COIs. It's because of not having sufficiently thought through which factors matter to ensure that the panel has adequate diversity regarding relevant epistemic perspectives.

Let's move from having a vested interest in a particular theory or method to having a financial conflict of interest. It goes without saying that a CEO for a company whose bottom line depends on a chemical should not be involved in regulatory decisions regarding that chemical as said CEO has the responsibility to tend to the financial bottom line and see to the interests of shareholders and employees. These are clearly competing interests. Even high-quality research produced by this company will fall under COI because the CEO, the board alongside managers, and others in the company with power to decide what is shared and how have a legal obligation to care for their employees and shareholders. It also seems reasonable that a researcher whose research depends on funding from said company should be required to recuse themselves, as this also is a clear competing interest. But the gray zones are large. For example, should an expert be allowed to have many shares in said company? What about a scientist working in a consulting laboratory with this company as their primary client? This is challenging terrain to navigate, and it requires thoughtful and careful deliberation, clear rules, and transparent communication.

We have heard through the scuttlebutt that some feel that our paper is an ad hominem attack on industry scientists, absolving academics. However, the paper's central claim is not that academics are more virtuous or have higher moral standards than scientists working in the private sector. There are people with questionable moral compasses in all sectors. The core claim is that the effectiveness of the proposed panel depends on the trust that it enjoys. In the case of the SPP, this is important not least because of the tarred reputation of the chemical industry caused by the scandalous behavior of certain individuals and industries (Michaels, 2008; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). To demonstrate good intentions and alignment with the SPP's goals, it lies in the industry's interest to support clear COI rules and transparent communication, as these are key to retaining public trust not only in the advice coming out of the SPP but also in the industry.

Notably, an increasing number of companies explicitly align their mission and vision with that of the panel as they strive to utilize green(er) principles, provide safer alternatives for essential products containing chemicals of concern, and prevent waste generation. This is very promising. To support this commendable work, we need a strong SPP, which requires clear and strict COI policies, transparency, and regular audits (Ågerstrand et al., 2023), as well as a clear understanding of the difference between legitimate interests and COIs. Pollution caused by synthetic substances has exceeded the planetary boundaries (Richardson et al., 2023), and we need to find ways to manage these sustainably. We cannot afford a toothless SPP, which it will be if it's not widely seen as rigorous and free from manipulation.

Gunilla Öberg: Conceptualization; investigation; writing—original draft. Martin Scheringer: Writing—review and editing.

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

"每个人都有利益":红线
我们最近在《环境科学与技术》(Environmental Science &amp; Technology)上发表的论文《化学品、废物和污染评估中的利益冲突》(Schäffer et al.这是好事。我们论文的读者反馈表明,利益冲突(COI)一词带有负面含义。这是令人遗憾的。显然,人们普遍认为,只要存在利益冲突就意味着存在不法行为。其实不然。作为专家顾问,我们的首要利益应该是为我们提供建议的组织的利益服务。利益冲突确实表明,参与某些决策是不合适的,因为我们有竞争利益,而这种竞争利益有可能影响我们提供与所建议组织的利益一致的建议的能力(Moore 等人,2005 年)。利益冲突政策能帮助我们保持正确的方向,因为我们通常会低估自己的利益会对我们的判断产生不当影响,高估自己保持中立的能力,并倾向于忽略所有难以驾驭的灰色地带(Chugh 等人,2005 年)。这就是为什么 COI 政策需要根据组织的使命和价值观精心制定并定期审查的原因。如果不恰当地界定或管理 COI,相关人员和组织的声誉很可能会受到质疑。严格的 COI 政策不仅是保护决策的需要,也是保护组织诚信的需要。当政策影响到许多人的健康和福祉时,这些政策就显得至关重要。这就是为什么为拟议中的化学品、废物和污染预防政府间科学政策小组(SPP)(联合国环境规划署,2024 年)制定严格的 COI 政策至关重要的原因,正如我们在上一篇论文(Schäffer 等人,2023 年)中所讨论的那样。然而,这只是个幌子。事实上,每个人都有利益。利益和价值观是每个人与生俱来的(道格拉斯,2021 年;埃利奥特,2017 年)。我们需要明确自己的价值观,并参与讨论我们的价值观和研究是否与社会目标相一致。值得注意的是,兴趣并不会自动导致 COI,关键是要认清什么是 COI(Bero &amp; Grundy, 2016)。例如,渴求声誉并不会自动导致利益冲突:只有当一个人渴求的声誉与他要提供建议的组织的利益相冲突时,才会导致利益冲突。SPP 的目标是进一步促进化学品和废物的健全管理,防止污染(联合国环境规划署,2024 年)。一个常见的论点是,喜欢出风头的研究人员具有 COI,因为--这种论点认为--这种利益会激励他们设计研究,使研究结果显示出相关化学品的不利影响,因为危言耸听的结果会成为头条新闻。不可否认,这是一个糟糕研究的例子,让一个从事劣质研究的人向专家小组提供建议是不明智的。但这并不属于 "个人隐私 "的范畴。他们的利益在于出风头,而出风头与专家小组的利益并不冲突。如果研究的质量很高,那么它很可能会对专家小组有价值,尽管有人想出风头。"我们都有利益 "的说法源于将 COI 与我们都有不同的利益、价值观和偏好这一事实混为一谈。越来越多的人认识到,多元化的研究团队可以降低在同质化社区中发酵的有偏见研究的风险(Hofstra 等人,2020 年;Nielsen 等人,2017 年)。值得注意的是,由不同的非经济利益而产生的科学争议是合理的,也是一种优势,因为它们有助于我们理清重要的价值问题,如:我们应该研究什么?我们应该研究什么?为什么是这样而不是那样?什么样的数据是相关的?研究方法对结果有何影响?谁会从这类研究中受益?我们的研究是否会导致伤害的不平等分配?重要的是,对特定理论或方法有既得利益并不会导致专家顾问的 COI。在化学品风险问题上,存在着大量的科学争议,尤其是因为这是一个高度复杂的领域,而且不乏对某一特定理论或方法情有独钟的科学家。因此,如果专家顾问过于单一,就有可能将相关观点排除在外。重要的是要记住,这并不是因为专家们有个人隐私。而是因为没有充分考虑哪些因素对确保专家小组在相关认识论观点方面具有充分的多样性至关重要。
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来源期刊
Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management
Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCESTOXICOLOGY&nbs-TOXICOLOGY
CiteScore
5.90
自引率
6.50%
发文量
156
期刊介绍: Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management (IEAM) publishes the science underpinning environmental decision making and problem solving. Papers submitted to IEAM must link science and technical innovations to vexing regional or global environmental issues in one or more of the following core areas: Science-informed regulation, policy, and decision making Health and ecological risk and impact assessment Restoration and management of damaged ecosystems Sustaining ecosystems Managing large-scale environmental change Papers published in these broad fields of study are connected by an array of interdisciplinary engineering, management, and scientific themes, which collectively reflect the interconnectedness of the scientific, social, and environmental challenges facing our modern global society: Methods for environmental quality assessment; forecasting across a number of ecosystem uses and challenges (systems-based, cost-benefit, ecosystem services, etc.); measuring or predicting ecosystem change and adaptation Approaches that connect policy and management tools; harmonize national and international environmental regulation; merge human well-being with ecological management; develop and sustain the function of ecosystems; conceptualize, model and apply concepts of spatial and regional sustainability Assessment and management frameworks that incorporate conservation, life cycle, restoration, and sustainability; considerations for climate-induced adaptation, change and consequences, and vulnerability Environmental management applications using risk-based approaches; considerations for protecting and fostering biodiversity, as well as enhancement or protection of ecosystem services and resiliency.
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