Taking Civilians: Terrorist Kidnapping in Civil War

Abstract

Why do insurgents resort to kidnapping in civil war? What explains variation in the selection and intensity of the tactic over time and space? Despite an increase in the use of kidnapping over time, existing research has yet to develop an explanation that explains spatiotemporal variation and extends beyond financial motivations. I argue the decision to kidnap hostages is shaped by insurgents’ behavioral interactions in the conflict environment. It occurs under two conditions: to generate support and reinstate bargaining capacity when organizations suffer military losses on the battlefield and to enforce loyalties and display strength when organizations face violent competition from other non-state actors. The observable implications of the theory are tested at the macro- and micro levels. At the macro-level, I conduct a quantitative cross-group analysis on over 200 organizations involved in an armed intrastate conflict (1989–2018). At the micro level, I consider the kidnapping strategy of the Taliban in Afghanistan over time and space (2010–2018). Taken together, the analyses provide robust support for the theory.