Perfect Freedom: T. H. Green's Kantian Conception

IF 0.7 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI:10.1353/hph.2024.a925521

David O. Brink

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Abstract

abstract: This essay explores different conceptions of freedom in Kant, Green, and their critics. Kant introduces three kinds of freedom—negative freedom, positive freedom or autonomy, and transcendental freedom. Sidgwick objects that Kant's conception of positive freedom is unable to explain how someone might be free and responsible for the wrong choices. Though Green rejects transcendental freedom, he thinks Kant's conception of practical freedom can be defended by identifying it with the capacity to be determined by practical reason. Green identifies his own tripartite conception of freedom—juridical freedom, moral freedom, and real freedom. He thinks that these are stages in the perfection of freedom. Green's tripartite conception provides a principled reply to Berlin's doubts about positive freedom, explains Kant's claims that respect and esteem are fitting attitudes toward different aspects of freedom, and supports Schiller's criticisms of Kantian freedom and virtue. Green's conception of freedom defends the best elements of the Kantian perspective while addressing legitimate worries. In doing so, it unifies different aspects of freedom in a way that is grounded in moral personality or rational nature.

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完美自由：T. H. 格林的康德理念

摘要：本文探讨了康德、格林及其批评者对自由的不同概念。康德提出了三种自由--消极自由、积极自由或自主，以及超验自由。西奇威克反对康德的积极自由概念，认为它无法解释一个人如何既是自由的，又要为错误的选择负责。虽然格林反对超验自由，但他认为康德的实践自由概念可以通过将其与由实践理性决定的能力相提并论而得到辩护。格林提出了自己的三元自由概念--法理自由、道德自由和现实自由。他认为这些都是自由完善的阶段。格林的三段论概念为柏林对积极自由的怀疑提供了一个原则性的回答，解释了康德关于尊重和尊敬是对自由不同方面的恰当态度的说法，并支持席勒对康德自由和美德的批评。格林的自由概念既捍卫了康德观点的精华，又解决了合理的担忧。在此过程中，它以一种立足于道德人格或理性本质的方式统一了自由的不同方面。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.20

自引率

0.00%

发文量

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