Optimal decisions of elderly care service supply chain with government intervention

Abstract

Government intervention plays an indispensable role in the development of the elderly care service supply chain (ECSSC). However, no research has focused on the optimal decision-making of the ECSSC considering government intervention under different channel power structures. This study establishes a three-stage ECSSC model, including the government sector, elderly care service provider and elderly care service integrator, while considering different government intervention measures and channel power structures. The service-level elasticity coefficient is defined as an uncertain variable, that can affect service demand and ESI service costs. This study explores the optimal decisions and market performance of the government and ECSSC under different channel power structures and government intervention, providing guidance for the ECSSC development and government decision-making. The results show that, first, government intervention is beneficial for the ECSSC, customers, and social welfare. Compared with the subsidy and service-level regulation scenario, only the former is beneficial for the supply chain, social welfare, and unit customer expenditure, but at the cost of lower service level and higher government expenditure. Second, different channel power structures do not affect service level, social welfare, and unit customer expenditure. However, the ESI-dominated structure favors ECSSC development. Third, the setting of the reward-penalty factor should not be too high, as, in this case, supply chain members, customers, and social welfare will benefit from the increased expected value of service level elasticity. At last, managerial insights are presented based on theoretical analysis and numerical experiment results.