State-society relations and the “re-industrialization” of the developed world: Power relations, coordination and growth paths

M. Sabry
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Rather than focusing only on economic growth, this research regards a growth path as a matrix of the performance in long-run growth and equality of distribution.FindingsUsing regression analysis and statistical data, the results suggest that the Co-Balanced mode, having higher levels of coordination and lower favoritism, leads to the best growth path among the four introduced modes, especially with its emphasis on high levels of venture capital availability and easiness of starting business. while the Lib-Capture mode, characterized by lower coordination and higher favoritism, seems to have the worst growth path and the best implemented policy for this mode is suggested to be high profit taxes that seem to counter the negative impact of the existing high levels of favoritism.Research limitations/implicationsDespite the important findings that this research has reached, this paper is mainly meant to open a further investigation into this topic and open this dimension that the research on VoC and political economy have under-researched. 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Abstract

PurposeThis paper investigates the effect of state-society relations on the industrially-related growth paths of developed countries.Design/methodology/approachIt introduces a novel theoretical framework, the state-business-labor relations (SBLR) framework, where four main actors are identified: the state, big businesspersons or tycoons, owners and managers of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) or Entrepreneurs and labor. Different SBLR categories or modes are introduced depending on levels of coordination and power relations between the studied actors. The paper then investigates how these SBLR modes, through adopting various policies targeting the industrial sector, lead to different growth paths. Rather than focusing only on economic growth, this research regards a growth path as a matrix of the performance in long-run growth and equality of distribution.FindingsUsing regression analysis and statistical data, the results suggest that the Co-Balanced mode, having higher levels of coordination and lower favoritism, leads to the best growth path among the four introduced modes, especially with its emphasis on high levels of venture capital availability and easiness of starting business. while the Lib-Capture mode, characterized by lower coordination and higher favoritism, seems to have the worst growth path and the best implemented policy for this mode is suggested to be high profit taxes that seem to counter the negative impact of the existing high levels of favoritism.Research limitations/implicationsDespite the important findings that this research has reached, this paper is mainly meant to open a further investigation into this topic and open this dimension that the research on VoC and political economy have under-researched. A deeper investigation of SBLR typologies that could only be possible by having richer datasets with more data on coordination for the whole world, rather than only the advanced economies, would further our understanding of the dynamics that shape the growth paths of different countries of the world.Practical implicationsTo realize the best industrial growth path, fighting favoritism should be an important objective. The negative impact of favoritism on innovation could not be disregarded in the eve of the fourth industrial revolution, where innovation is increasingly pivotal to future industrial development. Actively engaging societal groups in the policymaking process is important in addressing their concerns and balancing them at the same time. This should lead to the double benefit of formulating better policies that should foster growth as well as provide better distribution of this growth. High levels of coordination should help in realizing this objective. Yet, this could only be possible if societal groups are free to associate and aggregate their power and when there are means of preventing one actor from gaining more favorite treatment and exclusive influence over policymakers. The presence of both powerful and broadly represented business associations and labor unions and the existence of a government interested in coordinating their efforts-rather than letting itself be controlled by one group at the expense of the others-should help in the realization of the best growth path. Thus, institutional reform that empowers societal groups and enables them to defend their interests as well as fights all forms of corruption should lead to the realization of a more prosperous and equitable industrial development, with the “re-industrialization” of the developed world being no exception. The technological and social challenges of intensive automation and digitalization accompanying the fourth industrial revolution make the envisaged institutional reform more urgent.Originality/valueThis paper is introducing a novel theoretical framework for studying the effect of state-society relations, particularly SBLR, on the industrial growth paths of developed countries. It integrates three important bodies of literature in order to build a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of state-society relations and their economic consequences. These are the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC), State-Business Relations (SBR) and Industrial Relations. The SBLR framework differentiates between tycoons and entrepreneurs, an important distinction that often goes unnoticed. Different SBLR categories or modes are introduced, depending on levels of coordination and power relations between the actors. It is proposed in this research that the effect on growth paths goes beyond the simple dichotomy between CMEs and LMEs usually present in the literature of VoC and that power relations provide an essential complementary dimension in explaining this causality.
国家-社会关系与发达国家的 "再工业化":权力关系、协调和增长路径
本文引入了一个新颖的理论框架,即国家-企业-劳工关系(SBLR)框架,其中确定了四个主要行为体:国家、大企业主或大亨、中小企业(SMEs)的所有者和管理者或企业家以及劳工。根据研究对象之间的协调水平和权力关系,引入了不同的 SBLR 类别或模式。然后,本文将研究这些 SBLR 模式如何通过采取针对工业部门的各种政策,实现不同的增长路径。研究结果利用回归分析和统计数据,结果表明,在引入的四种模式中,协调程度较高、偏袒程度较低的 "共同平衡 "模式会带来最佳的增长路径,尤其是在强调高水平的风险资本可用性和创业便利性的情况下。研究的局限性/意义尽管本研究得出了重要的结论,但本文的主要目的是开启对这一主题的进一步研究,并打开 VoC 和政治经济学研究不足的这一维度。对 SBLR 类型进行更深入的研究,只有在拥有更丰富的数据集、更多的全球协调数据(而不仅仅是发达经济体的协调数据)的情况下才有可能,这将进一步加深我们对塑造世界不同国家增长路径的动力的理解。在第四次工业革命前夕,创新对未来工业发展的重要性日益凸显,因此不能忽视偏袒对创新的负面影响。让社会群体积极参与决策过程,对于解决他们的关切并同时平衡他们的关切非常重要。这将带来双重好处,即制定更好的政策,促进增长并更好地分配增长。高度协调应有助于实现这一目标。然而,这只有在社会群体能够自由结盟并汇聚其力量,以及有办法防止某一行为体获得更优惠的待遇和对政策制定者产生排他性影响的情况下才有可能实现。同时拥有强大的、具有广泛代表性的商业协会和工会,并且政府有兴趣协调他们的努力,而不是让自己被一个群体控制,牺牲其他群体的利益,这些都应有助于实现最佳增长路径。因此,赋予社会团体权力、使其能够维护自身利益并打击一切形式腐败的体制改革,应有助于实现更加繁荣和公平的工业发展,发达国家的 "再工业化 "也不例外。伴随第四次工业革命而来的密集自动化和数字化所带来的技术和社会挑战,使设想中的制度改革变得更加迫切。它整合了三个重要文献体系,以便更全面地理解国家-社会关系的动态及其经济后果。它们分别是《资本主义的变种》(VoC)、《国家-企业关系》(SBR)和《产业关系》。SBLR 框架对富豪和企业家进行了区分,这一重要区别往往不被人注意。根据行为者之间的协调水平和权力关系,引入了不同的 SBLR 类别或模式。本研究提出,对增长路径的影响超出了 VoC 文献中通常存在的 CME 和 LME 之间的简单二分法,权力关系为解释这种因果关系提供了一个重要的补充维度。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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