{"title":"Case preparation investments in the presence of costly judicial attention","authors":"Brishti Guha","doi":"10.1016/j.rie.2024.100957","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This is the first paper I am aware of to integrate litigants’ investment in pretrial case preparation with the fact that judges experience small costs to processing extra information conveyed by litigants. While a full-scale battle involving high case preparation by both parties would have obtained if litigants were confident that judges would review the extra evidence, costly judicial attention results either in an equilibrium where no one incurs case preparation expenses, or (if parties are relatively malicious, and judicial technology is efficient) in just one litigant, but not both, incurring such expenses. The latter possibility can create incentives for a signaling race. While costly judicial attention lowers case preparation expenses and generally makes litigants better off relative to the full attention case, it can also lead to fewer cases being immediately settled.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46094,"journal":{"name":"Research in Economics","volume":"78 2","pages":"Article 100957"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Research in Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090944324000218","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
This is the first paper I am aware of to integrate litigants’ investment in pretrial case preparation with the fact that judges experience small costs to processing extra information conveyed by litigants. While a full-scale battle involving high case preparation by both parties would have obtained if litigants were confident that judges would review the extra evidence, costly judicial attention results either in an equilibrium where no one incurs case preparation expenses, or (if parties are relatively malicious, and judicial technology is efficient) in just one litigant, but not both, incurring such expenses. The latter possibility can create incentives for a signaling race. While costly judicial attention lowers case preparation expenses and generally makes litigants better off relative to the full attention case, it can also lead to fewer cases being immediately settled.
期刊介绍：
Established in 1947, Research in Economics is one of the oldest general-interest economics journals in the world and the main one among those based in Italy. The purpose of the journal is to select original theoretical and empirical articles that will have high impact on the debate in the social sciences; since 1947, it has published important research contributions on a wide range of topics. A summary of our editorial policy is this: the editors make a preliminary assessment of whether the results of a paper, if correct, are worth publishing. If so one of the associate editors reviews the paper: from the reviewer we expect to learn if the paper is understandable and coherent and - within reasonable bounds - the results are correct. We believe that long lags in publication and multiple demands for revision simply slow scientific progress. Our goal is to provide you a definitive answer within one month of submission. We give the editors one week to judge the overall contribution and if acceptable send your paper to an associate editor. We expect the associate editor to provide a more detailed evaluation within three weeks so that the editors can make a final decision before the month expires. In the (rare) case of a revision we allow four months and in the case of conditional acceptance we allow two months to submit the final version. In both cases we expect a cover letter explaining how you met the requirements. For conditional acceptance the editors will verify that the requirements were met. In the case of revision the original associate editor will do so. If the revision cannot be at least conditionally accepted it is rejected: there is no second revision.
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