Why there are no Frankfurt‐style omission cases

Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-24 DOI:10.1111/nous.12500
Joseph Metz
{"title":"Why there are no Frankfurt‐style omission cases","authors":"Joseph Metz","doi":"10.1111/nous.12500","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Frankfurt‐style action cases have been immensely influential in the free will and moral responsibility literatures because they arguably show that an agent can be morally responsible for a behavior despite lacking the ability to do otherwise. However, even among the philosophers who accept Frankfurt‐style <jats:italic>action</jats:italic> cases, there remains significant disagreement about whether also to accept Frankfurt‐style <jats:italic>omission</jats:italic> cases – cases in which an agent omits to do something, is unable to do otherwise, and is allegedly morally responsible for that omission. Settling this debate about Frankfurt‐style omission cases is significant because the resolution entails an important fact about moral responsibility: whether there is there a moral asymmetry between actions and omissions with respect to the ability to do otherwise. My proposal is that both Frankfurt‐style action cases and omission cases involve the same type of causal structure: causal preemption. However, the preemptor and the preemptee differ. In action cases, the Frankfurted agent preempts the neuroscientist and is causally and morally responsibility for the effect. In omission cases, Frankfurted agent is neither causally nor morally responsible for the effect. Instead, the neuroscientist preempts the Frankfurted agent. Thus, there are no Frankfurt‐style omission cases.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":"98 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Noûs","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12500","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Frankfurt‐style action cases have been immensely influential in the free will and moral responsibility literatures because they arguably show that an agent can be morally responsible for a behavior despite lacking the ability to do otherwise. However, even among the philosophers who accept Frankfurt‐style action cases, there remains significant disagreement about whether also to accept Frankfurt‐style omission cases – cases in which an agent omits to do something, is unable to do otherwise, and is allegedly morally responsible for that omission. Settling this debate about Frankfurt‐style omission cases is significant because the resolution entails an important fact about moral responsibility: whether there is there a moral asymmetry between actions and omissions with respect to the ability to do otherwise. My proposal is that both Frankfurt‐style action cases and omission cases involve the same type of causal structure: causal preemption. However, the preemptor and the preemptee differ. In action cases, the Frankfurted agent preempts the neuroscientist and is causally and morally responsibility for the effect. In omission cases, Frankfurted agent is neither causally nor morally responsible for the effect. Instead, the neuroscientist preempts the Frankfurted agent. Thus, there are no Frankfurt‐style omission cases.
为什么没有法兰克福式的遗漏案例
法兰克福式的行动案例在自由意志和道德责任文献中具有巨大的影响力,因为这些案例可以说表明,一个行为主体尽管没有能力做其他事情,但仍然可以对某一行为负道德责任。然而,即使是在接受法兰克福式行动案例的哲学家中,对于是否也接受法兰克福式不作为案例--即行为主体不做某事,但又无法不做,并且据称要为这种不作为承担道德责任--仍然存在很大分歧。解决这场关于法兰克福式不作为案例的争论意义重大,因为这一问题的解决涉及道德责任的一个重要事实:行为与不作为之间是否存在道德上的不对称,即行为与不作为之间是否存在以其他方式行事的能力。我的建议是,法兰克福式的作为案件和不作为案件都涉及同一类因果结构:因果抢先。但是,先发制人者和被先发制人者有所不同。在行动案例中,法兰克福代理人抢先了神经科学家,并在因果和道德上对效果负责。在不作为情况下,法兰克福代理人既不对效果承担因果责任,也不承担道德责任。相反,神经科学家优先于法兰克福代理人。因此,不存在法兰克福式的遗漏情况。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信