{"title":"The consequences of seeing imagination as a dual-process virtue","authors":"Ingrid Malm Lindberg","doi":"10.1111/meta.12675","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Michael T. Stuart (2021 and 2022) has proposed imagination as an intellectual dual-process virtue, consisting of imagination<sub>1</sub> (underwritten by cognitive Type 1 processing) and imagination<sub>2</sub> (supported by Type 2 processing). This paper investigates the consequences of taking such an account seriously. It proposes that the dual-process view of imagination allows us to incorporate recent insights from virtue epistemology, providing a fresh perspective on how imagination can be epistemically reliable. The argument centers on the distinction between General Reliability (GR) and Functional System Reliability (FSR), for example in relation to Kengo Miyazono and Uko Tooming's (2023) argument for epistemic generativity. Furthermore, the paper claims that the dual-process virtue account enables us to integrate a wide range of findings from the literature on epistemology and imagination. Moreover, it suggests a novel way to distinguish the virtues of creativity and imagination and presents a case for viewing imagination as a virtue rather than a skill.</p>","PeriodicalId":46874,"journal":{"name":"METAPHILOSOPHY","volume":"55 2","pages":"162-174"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/meta.12675","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"METAPHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/meta.12675","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Michael T. Stuart (2021 and 2022) has proposed imagination as an intellectual dual-process virtue, consisting of imagination1 (underwritten by cognitive Type 1 processing) and imagination2 (supported by Type 2 processing). This paper investigates the consequences of taking such an account seriously. It proposes that the dual-process view of imagination allows us to incorporate recent insights from virtue epistemology, providing a fresh perspective on how imagination can be epistemically reliable. The argument centers on the distinction between General Reliability (GR) and Functional System Reliability (FSR), for example in relation to Kengo Miyazono and Uko Tooming's (2023) argument for epistemic generativity. Furthermore, the paper claims that the dual-process virtue account enables us to integrate a wide range of findings from the literature on epistemology and imagination. Moreover, it suggests a novel way to distinguish the virtues of creativity and imagination and presents a case for viewing imagination as a virtue rather than a skill.
期刊介绍：
Metaphilosophy publishes articles and reviews books stressing considerations about philosophy and particular schools, methods, or fields of philosophy. The intended scope is very broad: no method, field, or school is excluded.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
