Mindsets and politically motivated reasoning about fake news

IF 1.7 3区 心理学 Q3 PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL
Jonas Ludwig, Joseph Sommer
{"title":"Mindsets and politically motivated reasoning about fake news","authors":"Jonas Ludwig, Joseph Sommer","doi":"10.1007/s11031-024-10067-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>False information may be published with the intention of misleading the public, and such fake news is often difficult to detect. Ideological fake news may pose a particular challenge, as people may be less able to detect false information that supports their prior beliefs. The difficulty of detecting fake news with an ideological slant may be compounded if people are motivated to defend their beliefs. Building on the mindset theory of action phases, we investigated motivational states as moderators of people’s ability to detect fake news. We tested two competing predictions to study the cognitive and motivational processes implicated in fake news detection. Both predictions concern an ideological belief bias, where people tend to accept information that agrees with their partisan identities and to reject information that disagrees with them. First, motivated reasoning accounts posit that deliberation should reinforce the ideological belief bias because reasoning primarily serves to defend and rationalize one’s own position. An opposing view, based on dual-process theory, assumes that deliberation attenuates the ideological belief bias by facilitating an unbiased assessment of new information. An online experiment (<i>N</i> = 497) tested these competing accounts. Participants were induced with deliberative/implemental/control mindsets prior to rating the veracity of (true/fake) news headlines. Some headlines favored a Republican view; others leaned toward a Democrat perspective. Based on self-reported political preference (Democrat vs. Republican), headlines were categorized as congruent or incongruent with participants’ political views. Consistent with an ideological belief bias, participants accepted more congruent than incongruent news, and they were more likely to fail to detect favorable fake news. In the main analysis, mindsets did not moderate the ideological belief bias, but showed interesting relationships with cognitive reflection and dishonest behavior. Further exploration using signal-detection theory suggested that the deliberative mindset might be associated with increased skepticism, thereby promoting fake news detection.</p>","PeriodicalId":48282,"journal":{"name":"Motivation and Emotion","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Motivation and Emotion","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-024-10067-0","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

False information may be published with the intention of misleading the public, and such fake news is often difficult to detect. Ideological fake news may pose a particular challenge, as people may be less able to detect false information that supports their prior beliefs. The difficulty of detecting fake news with an ideological slant may be compounded if people are motivated to defend their beliefs. Building on the mindset theory of action phases, we investigated motivational states as moderators of people’s ability to detect fake news. We tested two competing predictions to study the cognitive and motivational processes implicated in fake news detection. Both predictions concern an ideological belief bias, where people tend to accept information that agrees with their partisan identities and to reject information that disagrees with them. First, motivated reasoning accounts posit that deliberation should reinforce the ideological belief bias because reasoning primarily serves to defend and rationalize one’s own position. An opposing view, based on dual-process theory, assumes that deliberation attenuates the ideological belief bias by facilitating an unbiased assessment of new information. An online experiment (N = 497) tested these competing accounts. Participants were induced with deliberative/implemental/control mindsets prior to rating the veracity of (true/fake) news headlines. Some headlines favored a Republican view; others leaned toward a Democrat perspective. Based on self-reported political preference (Democrat vs. Republican), headlines were categorized as congruent or incongruent with participants’ political views. Consistent with an ideological belief bias, participants accepted more congruent than incongruent news, and they were more likely to fail to detect favorable fake news. In the main analysis, mindsets did not moderate the ideological belief bias, but showed interesting relationships with cognitive reflection and dishonest behavior. Further exploration using signal-detection theory suggested that the deliberative mindset might be associated with increased skepticism, thereby promoting fake news detection.

Abstract Image

关于假新闻的心态和政治动机推理
发布虚假信息的目的可能是误导公众,而这类假新闻往往很难被发现。意识形态方面的假新闻可能会带来特殊的挑战,因为人们可能不太容易察觉到支持其先前信念的虚假信息。如果人们有维护自己信仰的动机,那么发现带有意识形态倾向的假新闻的难度可能会更大。在行动阶段心态理论的基础上,我们研究了动机状态对人们发现假新闻能力的调节作用。我们测试了两个相互竞争的预测,以研究与假新闻检测有关的认知和动机过程。这两种预测都涉及意识形态信仰偏差,即人们倾向于接受与其党派身份一致的信息,而拒绝与之不一致的信息。首先,动机推理说认为,审议应该会强化意识形态信仰偏差,因为推理主要是为了捍卫自己的立场并使之合理化。另一种基于双重过程理论的相反观点则认为,深思熟虑有助于对新信息进行无偏见的评估,从而削弱了意识形态信仰偏差。一项在线实验(N = 497)检验了这些相互竞争的观点。在对新闻标题(真实/虚假)的真实性进行评分之前,诱导受试者形成深思熟虑/执行/控制的思维模式。一些新闻标题倾向于共和党的观点,另一些则倾向于民主党的观点。根据自我报告的政治倾向(民主党与共和党),新闻标题被分为与参与者的政治观点一致或不一致。与意识形态信仰偏差一致的是,参与者接受的一致新闻多于不一致新闻,而且他们更有可能发现不了有利的假新闻。在主要分析中,心态并没有调节意识形态信仰偏差,但却显示出与认知反思和不诚实行为之间的有趣关系。利用信号检测理论进行的进一步探索表明,深思熟虑的心态可能与怀疑主义的增加有关,从而促进假新闻的检测。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
5.40
自引率
4.20%
发文量
69
期刊介绍: Motivation and Emotion publishes articles on human motivational and emotional phenomena that make theoretical advances by linking empirical findings to underlying processes. Submissions should focus on key problems in motivation and emotion, and, if using non-human participants, should contribute to theories concerning human behavior.  Articles should be explanatory rather than merely descriptive, providing the data necessary to understand the origins of motivation and emotion, to explicate why, how, and under what conditions motivational and emotional states change, and to document that these processes are important to human functioning.A range of methodological approaches are welcome, with methodological rigor as the key criterion.  Manuscripts that rely exclusively on self-report data are appropriate, but published articles tend to be those that rely on objective measures (e.g., behavioral observations, psychophysiological responses, reaction times, brain activity, and performance or achievement indicators) either singly or combination with self-report data.The journal generally does not publish scale development and validation articles.  However, it is open to articles that focus on the post-validation contribution that a new measure can make.  Scale development and validation work therefore may be submitted if it is used as a necessary prerequisite to follow-up studies that demonstrate the importance of the new scale in making a theoretical advance.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信