{"title":"La gouvernance d’entreprise: Un déterminant du management du risque bancaire","authors":"Aboubakre Haji, Mehdi Lechguar, Mohammed Adraoui","doi":"10.23882/rmd.24213","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The aim of our study is to propose ownership structure and board of directors as two innovative risk management criteria. Our mixed-method approach, combining a qualitative, exploratory study with 7 executives and a confirmatory quantitative study with 78 executives, aimed to assess the impact of these mechanisms on the risk of corporate failure. The results significantly demonstrate the influence of ownership structure and board of directors on default risk. Thus, examination of the interactions between the various players in the governance system reveals a relationship of support and complementarity rather than one of discipline. Our study confirms that the configuration of the ownership structure and the composition of the board of directors play a key role in preventing corporate credit risk. Thus, these results suggest that optimizing these mechanisms may not only reduce the risk of default, but also provide a perspective for a comprehensive and proactive approach to bank credit risk.","PeriodicalId":516301,"journal":{"name":"revistamultidisciplinar.com","volume":"28 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"revistamultidisciplinar.com","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.23882/rmd.24213","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The aim of our study is to propose ownership structure and board of directors as two innovative risk management criteria. Our mixed-method approach, combining a qualitative, exploratory study with 7 executives and a confirmatory quantitative study with 78 executives, aimed to assess the impact of these mechanisms on the risk of corporate failure. The results significantly demonstrate the influence of ownership structure and board of directors on default risk. Thus, examination of the interactions between the various players in the governance system reveals a relationship of support and complementarity rather than one of discipline. Our study confirms that the configuration of the ownership structure and the composition of the board of directors play a key role in preventing corporate credit risk. Thus, these results suggest that optimizing these mechanisms may not only reduce the risk of default, but also provide a perspective for a comprehensive and proactive approach to bank credit risk.