Electoral incentives and the management of budgetary results through unpaid commitment

Ronaldo José Rêgo de Araújo, D. Queiroz, Edilson Paulo
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Abstract

This research aims to analyze the effect of electoral political cycles on the management of budgetary results by observing the unpaid commitments of Brazilian local governments. The study proposes a model to estimate discretionary budgetary accruals based on unpaid commitments, addressing an empirical-theoretical gap regarding incipient quality metrics of accounting information in public administration, considering the theory of agency, legitimacy, and impression management. The theory of political cycles was adopted to justify the managers’ opportunistic cyclical behavior aligned with the electoral calendar. Three hypotheses based on the literature were tested from a sample covering 62.1% of Brazilian municipalities. The results showed positive discretionary budgetary accruals in the years immediately preceding the elections and the opposite in election years (i.e., negative discretionary budgetary accruals), completing the budgetary electoral cycle. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that managers in their first term are more inclined to enter into this type of practice, motivated by the chances of being re-elected. This evidence is ratified by the absence of this practice at significant levels during the managers’ second term. This research incrementally contributes to public administration research, proposing a proxy for the quality of government accounting information. It proves that earnings management, measured by discretionary budgetary accruals, has cyclical behavior aligned with the electoral calendar.
选举激励和通过无偿承诺管理预算结果
本研究旨在通过观察巴西地方政府的未支付承付款,分析选举政治周期对预算结果管理的影响。研究提出了一个基于未支付承付款估算酌情应计预算的模型,解决了公共管理会计信息质量指标方面的经验理论空白,同时考虑了代理、合法性和印象管理理论。研究采用了政治周期理论,以证明管理者的机会主义周期行为与选举日程相一致。根据文献提出的三个假设,对巴西 62.1%的城市进行了抽样检验。结果表明,在选举前几年,可自由支配的预算应计额为正数,而在选举年则相反(即可自由支配的预算应计额为负数),从而完成了预算选举周期。此外,研究还表明,出于对连任机会的考虑,第一任期的管理人员更倾向于采取这种做法。在管理者的第二个任期内,这种做法在很大程度上并不存在,从而证实了这一点。本研究为公共管理研究做出了重要贡献,提出了政府会计信息质量的替代指标。研究证明,以可自由支配的预算应计制衡量的收益管理具有与选举日程相一致的周期性行为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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