Does stock liquidity affect expropriation behavior by controlling shareholders? Evidence from China

Abstract

When a firm is controlled by a large shareholder, the principal agency problem arises from expropriation by controlling shareholders of other shareholders. Using a sample of 3776 publicly traded firms in the Chinese A-share market over the period 2007–2020, this study investigates whether stock liquidity impedes or enhances the expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders. I demonstrate that (1) a liquid stock market generally encourages expropriation behavior by controlling shareholders, (2) the positive effect of stock liquidity on expropriation by controlling shareholders is mitigated when active investors hold a large stake in the firm, and (3) active investors’ monitoring of expropriation by controlling shareholders is mitigated at state-owned enterprises and firms that have a large gap between ownership and control. However, higher competition among blockholders strengthens the discipline of active investors with respect to expropriation. This study builds a new link between a market factor (stock liquidity) and a governance problem (expropriation by controlling shareholders) and reveals some new characteristics in the relationship between stock liquidity and corporate governance in an emerging market.