Petro-states, oil shocks, and regime change: Venezuela and Ecuador, 2013–2023

Abstract

The literature on petrostates tends to blackbox the state. We argue, in contrast, that not all petro-states are configured equally. They thus respond to external crises differently. Despite sharing similar background conditions, the petro-state of Venezuela responded to the external oil shock of 2014–2015 by turning more authoritarian and predatory, whereas the petro-state of Ecuador tried to become more democratic and developmental. To explain this difference, we focus on three within-state institutional differences between these cases: the cohesion of hardliners, the reach of the coercive military and paramilitary apparatus, and the viability of the public and private sectors. In short, even petro-states operating under similar regimes (in this case, left-populist, semi-authoritarian) can exhibit different institutional make-ups, and these institutional differences help explain responses to similar external shocks.