Familial Reputation, Bias and Impartial Arbitrators “on the Field”*

IF 0.9 Q3 ECONOMICS
Liam J. A. Lenten, Adrian J. Barake, Mark F. Stewart
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Those with intra-organisational familial links often advance more quickly due to nepotism. We harness a large database from a natural setting relating to a specific paternal mechanism in professional sport; with our results suggesting that when external arbitrators are utilised as a tool to ensure fairness of assessments, there is effectively no evidence of performance evaluation bias in favour of subjects with the internal benefit of family reputation. This suggests that impartial assessors may be an appropriate method of safeguarding against nepotism within organisations. However, there is still some weak evidence that the influence of the agent's family name can itself still make a difference.

家族声誉、偏见和 "在现场 "的公正仲裁员 *
由于裙带关系,那些与组织内部有亲属关系的人往往晋升更快。我们从自然环境中获取了一个大型数据库,该数据库与职业体育中特定的父系机制有关;我们的结果表明,当利用外部仲裁员作为确保评估公平性的工具时,实际上没有证据表明绩效评估偏向于具有家庭声誉内部利益的对象。这表明,公正的评估员可能是防止组织内部裙带关系的一种适当方法。不过,仍有一些微弱的证据表明,代理人姓氏的影响本身仍会造成差异。
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来源期刊
Economic Papers
Economic Papers ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
23
期刊介绍: Economic Papers is one of two journals published by the Economics Society of Australia. The journal features a balance of high quality research in applied economics and economic policy analysis which distinguishes it from other Australian journals. The intended audience is the broad range of economists working in business, government and academic communities within Australia and internationally who are interested in economic issues related to Australia and the Asia-Pacific region. Contributions are sought from economists working in these areas and should be written to be accessible to a wide section of our readership. All contributions are refereed.
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