Liam J. A. Lenten, Adrian J. Barake, Mark F. Stewart
{"title":"Familial Reputation, Bias and Impartial Arbitrators “on the Field”*","authors":"Liam J. A. Lenten, Adrian J. Barake, Mark F. Stewart","doi":"10.1111/1759-3441.12413","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Those with intra-organisational familial links often advance more quickly due to nepotism. We harness a large database from a natural setting relating to a specific paternal mechanism in professional sport; with our results suggesting that when external arbitrators are utilised as a tool to ensure fairness of assessments, there is effectively no evidence of performance evaluation bias in favour of subjects with the internal benefit of family reputation. This suggests that impartial assessors may be an appropriate method of safeguarding against nepotism within organisations. However, there is still some weak evidence that the influence of the agent's family name can itself still make a difference.</p>","PeriodicalId":45208,"journal":{"name":"Economic Papers","volume":"44 1","pages":"77-90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1759-3441.12413","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economic Papers","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1759-3441.12413","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Those with intra-organisational familial links often advance more quickly due to nepotism. We harness a large database from a natural setting relating to a specific paternal mechanism in professional sport; with our results suggesting that when external arbitrators are utilised as a tool to ensure fairness of assessments, there is effectively no evidence of performance evaluation bias in favour of subjects with the internal benefit of family reputation. This suggests that impartial assessors may be an appropriate method of safeguarding against nepotism within organisations. However, there is still some weak evidence that the influence of the agent's family name can itself still make a difference.
期刊介绍:
Economic Papers is one of two journals published by the Economics Society of Australia. The journal features a balance of high quality research in applied economics and economic policy analysis which distinguishes it from other Australian journals. The intended audience is the broad range of economists working in business, government and academic communities within Australia and internationally who are interested in economic issues related to Australia and the Asia-Pacific region. Contributions are sought from economists working in these areas and should be written to be accessible to a wide section of our readership. All contributions are refereed.