{"title":"Competition after mergers near review thresholds","authors":"Michael Weichselbaumer","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103066","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Size thresholds determine whether a national authority reviews a merger and separate national and supranational responsibility. Firms could pursue competition-reducing mergers before they come under any regulatory oversight. Using data on German procurement auctions, I analyse competition effects near review thresholds. Four years after a merger, competition in procurement auctions decreases after mergers that are reviewed by the German national authority, relative to mergers below the threshold. However, when acquiror and target competed in procurement auctions before the merger, competition relatively increases after a German national merger review. Anti-competitive effects after nationally reviewed mergers without pre-merger activity in procurement may get unnoticed by the authority.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718724000213","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Size thresholds determine whether a national authority reviews a merger and separate national and supranational responsibility. Firms could pursue competition-reducing mergers before they come under any regulatory oversight. Using data on German procurement auctions, I analyse competition effects near review thresholds. Four years after a merger, competition in procurement auctions decreases after mergers that are reviewed by the German national authority, relative to mergers below the threshold. However, when acquiror and target competed in procurement auctions before the merger, competition relatively increases after a German national merger review. Anti-competitive effects after nationally reviewed mergers without pre-merger activity in procurement may get unnoticed by the authority.
期刊介绍：
The IJIO is an international venture that aims at full coverage of theoretical and empirical questions in industrial organization. This includes classic questions of strategic behavior and market structure. The journal also seeks to publish articles dealing with technological change, internal organization of firms, regulation, antitrust and productivity analysis. We recognize the need to allow for diversity of perspectives and research styles in industrial organization and we encourage submissions in theoretical work, empirical work, and case studies. The journal will also occasionally publish symposia on topical issues.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
