Political vigilantism in Ghana: Motives, membership, and financing

IF 1.4 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Politics & Policy Pub Date : 2024-03-14 DOI:10.1111/polp.12592

Osman Antwi-Boateng, Mohammed Kamarideen Braimah

{"title":"Political vigilantism in Ghana: Motives, membership, and financing","authors":"Osman Antwi-Boateng, Mohammed Kamarideen Braimah","doi":"10.1111/polp.12592","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n \n <section>\n \n <p>This comprehensive study of political vigilantism in Ghana examines the motives, membership, and financing of the phenomenon and proffers solutions to combat it. We use a qualitative methodology of personal interviews with a broad section of Ghanaian political stakeholders totaling 50 participants. This included 30 political vigilante members equally affiliated with the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress and selected from the vigilante hotbeds of the Northern, Upper East, and Ashanti regions of Ghana. The other political stakeholders total 20 and are made up of: five public political party executives, five civil society members, five police officers, and five local district assembly members. The motives include institutional weakness, winning political power, and economic and group solidarity. Membership involves family and friends, former security personnel, party members, and unemployed youth. Financing emanates from political parties, politicians, and the business class. We argue that patron–clientelism is the driving force behind political vigilantism and recommend more legal accountability for patrons, particularly through constitutional amendments guaranteeing a fixed term for the head of the police and separating the roles of Attorney General and Minister of Justice. This is to ensure that the former can impartially prosecute vigilante patrons. Punitive financial measures are also recommended to deter patrons, backed by sustained public education and more employment opportunities for the masses of unemployed youth—the bedrock of political vigilantism.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Related Articles</h3>\n \n <p>Akwei, Cynthia, Isaac S. Damoah, and Joseph Amankwah-Amoah. 2020. “The Effects of Politics on the Implementation of Government Programs/Projects: Insights from a Developing Economy.” <i>Politics & Policy</i> 48(6): 1161–201. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12384.</p>\n \n <p>Asiegbu, Martin F., Okey Marcellus Ikeanyibe, Pius Otu Abang, Okwudili Chukwuma Nwosu, and Chuka Eugene Ugwu. 2024. “Natural Resource Fund Governance and the Institutionalization of Rent Seeking in Nigeria's Oil Sector.” <i>Politics & Policy</i> 52(1): Early View. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12579.</p>\n \n <p>Debrah, Emmanuel. 2016. “Decentralization, District Chief Executives, and District Assemblies in Ghana's Fourth Republic.” <i>Politics & Policy</i> 44 (1): 135–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12146.</p>\n </section>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":51679,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Policy","volume":"52 2","pages":"403-425"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Politics & Policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12592","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This comprehensive study of political vigilantism in Ghana examines the motives, membership, and financing of the phenomenon and proffers solutions to combat it. We use a qualitative methodology of personal interviews with a broad section of Ghanaian political stakeholders totaling 50 participants. This included 30 political vigilante members equally affiliated with the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress and selected from the vigilante hotbeds of the Northern, Upper East, and Ashanti regions of Ghana. The other political stakeholders total 20 and are made up of: five public political party executives, five civil society members, five police officers, and five local district assembly members. The motives include institutional weakness, winning political power, and economic and group solidarity. Membership involves family and friends, former security personnel, party members, and unemployed youth. Financing emanates from political parties, politicians, and the business class. We argue that patron–clientelism is the driving force behind political vigilantism and recommend more legal accountability for patrons, particularly through constitutional amendments guaranteeing a fixed term for the head of the police and separating the roles of Attorney General and Minister of Justice. This is to ensure that the former can impartially prosecute vigilante patrons. Punitive financial measures are also recommended to deter patrons, backed by sustained public education and more employment opportunities for the masses of unemployed youth—the bedrock of political vigilantism.

Akwei, Cynthia, Isaac S. Damoah, and Joseph Amankwah-Amoah. 2020. “The Effects of Politics on the Implementation of Government Programs/Projects: Insights from a Developing Economy.” Politics & Policy 48(6): 1161–201. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12384.

Asiegbu, Martin F., Okey Marcellus Ikeanyibe, Pius Otu Abang, Okwudili Chukwuma Nwosu, and Chuka Eugene Ugwu. 2024. “Natural Resource Fund Governance and the Institutionalization of Rent Seeking in Nigeria's Oil Sector.” Politics & Policy 52(1): Early View. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12579.

Debrah, Emmanuel. 2016. “Decentralization, District Chief Executives, and District Assemblies in Ghana's Fourth Republic.” Politics & Policy 44 (1): 135–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12146.

查看原文本刊更多论文

加纳的政治治安维持会：动机、成员和资金来源

这项关于加纳政治私刑的综合研究探讨了这种现象的动机、成员和资金来源，并提出了打击这种现象的解决方案。我们采用定性方法，对加纳政治利益相关者进行了广泛的个人访谈，共有 50 人参加。其中包括 30 名同样隶属于新爱国党（New Patriotic Party）和全国民主大会党（National Democratic Congress）的政治民团成员，他们都是从加纳北部、上东部和阿散蒂地区的民团温床中挑选出来的。其他政治利益相关者共有 20 人，包括：5 名公共政党执行官、5 名民间社会成员、5 名警官和 5 名地方区议会议员。其动机包括体制薄弱、赢得政治权力以及经济和团体团结。成员包括家人和朋友、前安全人员、党员和失业青年。资金来自政党、政客和商界。我们认为，赞助人-客户主义是政治私刑背后的驱动力，并建议对赞助人加强法律问责，特别是通过宪法修正案保证警察负责人的固定任期，并将总检察长和司法部长的角色分开。这是为了确保总检察长能够公正地起诉私刑资助人。此外，还建议采取惩罚性财政措施来震慑私刑赞助人，并辅之以持续的公共教育和为广大失业青年提供更多就业机会--政治私刑的基石。2020."政治对政府计划/项目实施的影响：发展中经济体的启示"。政治与政策》48（6）：https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12384.Asiegbu, Martin F., Okey Marcellus Ikeanyibe, Pius Otu Abang, Okwudili Chukwuma Nwosu, and Chuka Eugene Ugwu.2024."自然资源基金治理与尼日利亚石油部门寻租的制度化》。Politics & Policy 52(1)：https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12579.Debrah, Emmanuel.2016."加纳第四共和国的权力下放、地区行政长官和地区议会》。Politics & Policy 44 (1)：135–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12146.

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Politics & Policy POLITICAL SCIENCE-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

23.10%

发文量