Career Mobility and Performance Evaluation of China's SOE Managerial Elites

Linlin Zhang, Feng Liu, Xin Yuan
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Abstract

This paper examines the career mobility and performance evaluation of the leaders of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at the central, provincial and prefectural levels. Using data on executive turnover within publicly listed SOEs, we find that central and local SOE leaders have a similar career flow pattern. Specifically, vertical mobility within the same business group is common and more than 60 per cent of SOE leaders leave their office within three years. Only a minority of SOE leaders achieve political promotion. We also find that performance evaluation criteria are different across central and local SOEs. The leaders who provide better economic outcomes for central SOEs obtain a higher evaluation score, while close political connections boost the promotion prospects of local SOE leaders. Overall, our findings provide granular evidence on the personnel management of China's SOEs from a comparative perspective.
中国国企管理精英的职业流动与绩效评估
本文研究了中国中央、省级和地市级国有企业领导人的职业流动和绩效评估。利用上市国有企业高管流动的数据,我们发现中央和地方国有企业领导人的职业流动模式相似。具体而言,同一企业集团内的纵向流动非常普遍,超过 60% 的国企领导人在三年内离职。只有少数国企领导人能获得政治晋升。我们还发现,中央和地方国有企业的绩效评估标准各不相同。为中央国有企业带来更好经济效益的领导人会获得更高的评价分数,而密切的政治关系则会提升地方国有企业领导人的晋升前景。总之,我们的研究结果从比较的角度为中国国有企业的人事管理提供了详细的证据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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