Trade, industrial, and privatization policies with endogenous market structure

IF 0.7 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Manchester School Pub Date : 2024-03-21 DOI:10.1111/manc.12477

Shih-Shen Chen, Po-Sheng Ko, Jen-Yao Lee, Chien-Shu Tsai

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study finds that in an international mixed oligopoly at free entry equilibrium, social welfare under import tariff cum privatization is higher than output subsidy cum privatization, and the dual subsidy-tariff policy cum privatization degenerates into a single tariff policy cum privatization. The reason is that an output subsidy or the dual subsidy-tariff policy will incentivize domestic private firms to enter the free-entry equilibrium. Thus, the number of domestic firms with free entry is excessive, and social welfare deteriorates. A privatization policy is pivotal in the long run and is still more effective than a single subsidy policy.

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具有内生市场结构的贸易、工业和私有化政策

本研究发现，在自由进入均衡的国际混合寡头垄断中，进口关税兼私有化下的社会福利高于产出补贴兼私有化，而双重补贴-关税政策兼私有化会退化为单一关税政策兼私有化。原因在于，产出补贴或双重补贴-关税政策将激励国内私营企业进入自由进入均衡。因此，自由进入的国内企业数量过多，社会福利恶化。从长远来看，私有化政策至关重要，而且仍然比单一补贴政策更有效。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Manchester School ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

9.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Manchester School was first published more than seventy years ago and has become a distinguished, internationally recognised, general economics journal. The Manchester School publishes high-quality research covering all areas of the economics discipline, although the editors particularly encourage original contributions, or authoritative surveys, in the fields of microeconomics (including industrial organisation and game theory), macroeconomics, econometrics (both theory and applied) and labour economics.