{"title":"Comparison of Distribution Procedures in Blended Finance","authors":"A. V. Shchepkin","doi":"10.1134/S0005117923120056","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper is devoted to the blended (joint) finance mechanism of a megaproject consisting of several projects. One part of the megaproject budget comes from the megaproject manager and the other part from project contractors. When distributing this budget, the megaproject manager considers information about the amount of the contractor’s internal funds allocated to project implementation. Project contractors seek to get more funds from the megaproject manager; in turn, the megaproject manager is interested in attracting more funds from project contractors. To achieve this goal, the megaproject manager applies different procedures to distribute the budget. Project contractors use the information reported to the megaproject manager to increase the funds allocated to them. Straight and reverse priority distribution procedures in the blended finance mechanism are analyzed. A distribution procedure is determined that stimulates project contractors to allocate more of their internal funds to the project in a Nash equilibrium.</p>","PeriodicalId":55411,"journal":{"name":"Automation and Remote Control","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Automation and Remote Control","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1134/S0005117923120056","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper is devoted to the blended (joint) finance mechanism of a megaproject consisting of several projects. One part of the megaproject budget comes from the megaproject manager and the other part from project contractors. When distributing this budget, the megaproject manager considers information about the amount of the contractor’s internal funds allocated to project implementation. Project contractors seek to get more funds from the megaproject manager; in turn, the megaproject manager is interested in attracting more funds from project contractors. To achieve this goal, the megaproject manager applies different procedures to distribute the budget. Project contractors use the information reported to the megaproject manager to increase the funds allocated to them. Straight and reverse priority distribution procedures in the blended finance mechanism are analyzed. A distribution procedure is determined that stimulates project contractors to allocate more of their internal funds to the project in a Nash equilibrium.
期刊介绍：
Automation and Remote Control is one of the first journals on control theory. The scope of the journal is control theory problems and applications. The journal publishes reviews, original articles, and short communications (deterministic, stochastic, adaptive, and robust formulations) and its applications (computer control, components and instruments, process control, social and economy control, etc.).
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
