Assessing One Health capacities for transboundary zoonotic diseases at the Libya-Tunisia border.

IF 3.8 Q2 INFECTIOUS DISEASES
Lauren N Miller, Walid K Saadawi, Wafa Ben Hamouda, Ahmed S Elgari, Emaduldin A Abdulkarim, Ashur M M Lmrabet, Abir E Elbukhmari, Kaouther Harabech, Ammar Ali Jemai, Milad Farhat, Rasha Al-Azab, Abdulaziz Zorgani, Omar Elamher, Tarek Al Sanouri, Claire J Standley, Erin M Sorrell
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Abstract

Background: The dynamic nature of zoonotic emergence, spillover and spread necessitates multisectoral coordination beyond national borders to encompass cross-boundary and regional cooperation. Designated points of entry (POEs), specifically ground crossings, serve as critical locales for establishing and maintaining robust prevention, detection, notification, coordination, and response mechanisms to transboundary emerging and re-emerging disease threats. In order to better assess One Health capacities for transboundary zoonotic diseases (TZD) prevention, detection and response we adapted an existing tool, One Health Systems Assessment for Priority Zoonoses (OHSAPZ), for a cross-border, POE setting in North Africa.

Methods: The One Health Transboundary Assessment for Priority Zoonoses (OHTAPZ) tool was used to support prioritization of transboundary zoonoses and analyze operational capacities between national and subnational-level human and animal health stakeholders from Libya and Tunisia. Country partners jointly identified and prioritized five TZDs of concern. Case study scenarios for each priority pathogen were used to elicit current disease operations, as well as multisectoral and bilateral engagement networks. Finally, a gap analysis was performed to determine bilateral strengths and weaknesses to TZDs.

Results: The five priority TZDs jointly confirmed to undergo One Health assessment were avian influenza (low and high pathogenic strains); brucellosis; Rift Valley fever; Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever; and rabies. Using the qualitative information collected, a transboundary systems map schematic was developed outlining the movement of human patients, animals, diagnostic samples, and routes of communication and coordination both within and between countries for zoonotic diseases.

Conclusions: Analysis of current operations (prevention, detection, surveillance, laboratory capacity, quarantine/isolation, and response) and the resulting transboundary systems map schematic helped identify existing capacity strengths for certain priority pathogens, as well as challenges to timely information-sharing and coordination. We developed targeted recommendations to address these limitations for joint action planning between Libya and Tunisia.

评估利比亚-突尼斯边境跨境人畜共患病的 "一体健康 "能力。
背景:由于人畜共患病的出现、蔓延和扩散具有动态性,因此有必要进行超越国界的多部门协调,以涵盖跨境和区域合作。指定的入境点(POE),特别是地面过境点,是建立和维持强有力的预防、检测、通知、协调和应对机制以应对跨境新发和再发疾病威胁的关键地点。为了更好地评估 "一体卫生 "在预防、检测和应对跨境人畜共患病(TZD)方面的能力,我们对现有工具 "重点人畜共患病一体卫生系统评估"(OHSAPZ)进行了调整,使其适用于北非的跨境 POE 环境:方法:我们使用 "人畜共患病优先跨境卫生评估"(OHTAPZ)工具来支持跨境人畜共患病的优先排序,并分析利比亚和突尼斯的国家和国家以下各级人类和动物健康利益相关者的业务能力。国家合作伙伴共同确定了五种受关注的 TZDs,并将其列为优先事项。针对每种优先病原体的案例研究情景被用来了解当前的疾病行动以及多部门和双边参与网络。最后,进行了差距分析,以确定与高致病性疾病有关的双边优势和劣势:共同确认进行 "一体健康 "评估的五种优先高致病性疾病是禽流感(低致病性和高致病性菌株)、布鲁氏菌病、裂谷热、克里米亚-刚果出血热和狂犬病。利用收集到的定性信息,绘制了一幅跨界系统图,概述了人类患者、动物、诊断样本的流动情况,以及国家内部和国家之间就人畜共患疾病进行沟通和协调的路线:对当前行动(预防、检测、监控、实验室能力、检疫/隔离和响应)的分析以及由此绘制的跨境系统示意图有助于确定某些重点病原体的现有能力优势,以及在及时共享信息和协调方面所面临的挑战。我们提出了有针对性的建议,以解决利比亚和突尼斯联合行动规划中的这些局限性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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