Oligarchy in professional accounting bodies: Challenges for governance and leader-member relations

Abstract

Drawing on Robert Michels's “iron law” of oligarchy, this study examines a governance crisis that unfolded at one of the world's largest professional accounting bodies (PABs)—CPA Australia. We leverage Michels's century-old contribution to the social sciences to explore how this crisis sheds light on the challenges that PAB governance arrangements can pose when PAB leadership and membership priorities conflict. By applying Michels's seminal work to theorize the origins, escalation, leadership collapse, and eventual resolution of this PAB governance crisis, we illuminate how governance arrangements fueled conflict and fostered a democratic deficit that frustrated sections of the membership in their attempts to debate issues, exercise accountability on leadership matters, and become involved in governance reform. Overall, our analysis reveals that despite espoused principles of equity and participation, PABs are vulnerable to oligarchy impacting how their leaders relate to the interests of their members. Implications for the capacity of PABs to accommodate member conflict and for member participation in the current-day professional context are discussed.