The evolutionary analysis of investment in CCS-EOR under dual carbon target—From the perspective of multi-agent involvement

IF 4.6 3区 工程技术 Q2 ENERGY & FUELS
Weiwei Zhang, Ximei Chen, Jie Tian
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Carbon capture and storage with enhanced oil recovery (CCS-EOR) technology plays a crucial role in achieving dual carbon targets in China. And the rapid diffusion of technology requires collaboration among various stakeholders involved in industrial chain of CCS-EOR project and then it will cause conflict of interest among the participants. In order to solve the problem existing in CCS-EOR promotion and propel the rapid deployment of low-carbon technology in China, the paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model by incorporating the strategic choices of coal-fired power plants, oilfield enterprises and governments into the framework, explores the respective dynamic evolutionary path of three parties and analyzes the impact of each parameter change on the system evolution results Through the numerical simulation, the paper identifies the optimal evolutionary path to spur the application of CCS-EOR and determine their strategy choices of three involved subjects in the game framework. Based on the sensitivity analysis, results are given as follows: (1) The government's clean electricity subsidy and carbon utilization subsidy have pushed the timing of CCS retrofitting significantly forward, but the initial investment subsidy has little impact on it; (2) Under the cooperation mode of coal-fired power plants and oilfield enterprises, the optimal cost-sharing ratio of the initial investment for coal-fired power plants is about 0.4 to promote both sides to reach cooperation faster. Once it exceeds 0.4, the probability of cooperation between them will be significantly reduced; (3) The carbon tax policy effectively propels the development of CCS-EOR technology. When the carbon tax rises from 30 CNY/t to 120CNY/t, power plants will conduct CCS retrofitting investment two years in advance.

双碳目标下CCS-EOR投资的演化分析--从多主体参与的视角
碳捕集与封存提高采收率(CCS-EOR)技术在中国实现双碳目标的过程中发挥着至关重要的作用。而技术的快速推广需要CCS-EOR项目产业链上各利益相关方的通力合作,这就会造成参与方之间的利益冲突。为解决CCS-EOR推广过程中存在的问题,推动低碳技术在中国的快速应用,本文构建了一个三方演化博弈模型,将燃煤电厂、油田企业和政府的战略选择纳入博弈框架,探索三方各自的动态演化路径,分析各参数变化对系统演化结果的影响。基于敏感性分析,结果如下:(1)政府的清洁电价补贴和碳利用补贴推动了CCS改造时间的大幅提前,但初始投资补贴对其影响不大;(2)在燃煤电厂与油田企业合作模式下,燃煤电厂初始投资的最优成本分摊比例约为0.4,以促进双方更快达成合作。一旦超过 0.4,双方合作的概率将大大降低;(3)碳税政策有效推动了 CCS-EOR 技术的发展。当碳税从 30 元/吨上升到 120 元/吨时,电厂会提前两年进行 CCS 改造投资。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.20
自引率
10.30%
发文量
199
审稿时长
4.8 months
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control is a peer reviewed journal focusing on scientific and engineering developments in greenhouse gas control through capture and storage at large stationary emitters in the power sector and in other major resource, manufacturing and production industries. The Journal covers all greenhouse gas emissions within the power and industrial sectors, and comprises both technical and non-technical related literature in one volume. Original research, review and comments papers are included.
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