Service Outsourcing and Government Fiscal Conditions: Do Market Competition, Bureaucrat Support, and Management Capacity Matter?

Wenchi Wei, Xin Chen
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Abstract

Scholars have long regarded government fiscal stress as a crucial factor driving public service outsourcing; however, further investigation is still needed to determine whether service outsourcing in turn helps governments improve fiscal conditions. Public choice theory suggests that outsourcing services can lead to efficiency improvement and cost savings. Nevertheless, transaction costs theory implies that the costs associated with service outsourcing may offset or even outweigh its potential benefits. Moreover, the extent of transaction costs depends on contextual factors such as market competition, bureaucrat support, and government management capacity. Empirically, we employ an instrumental variable estimation approach to examine the impact of service outsourcing on the budget balances and debt levels of U.S. municipalities. We find that service outsourcing improves government fiscal conditions, with contextual factors playing an important role in moderating this effect. Additionally, outsourcing services to different types of contractors has varying implications for government fiscal conditions.
服务外包与政府财政状况:市场竞争、官僚支持和管理能力重要吗?
长期以来,学者们一直将政府的财政压力视为推动公共服务外包的关键因素;然而,要确定服务外包是否反过来有助于政府改善财政状况,仍需进一步研究。公共选择理论认为,服务外包可以提高效率、节约成本。然而,交易成本理论表明,服务外包的相关成本可能会抵消甚至超过其潜在效益。此外,交易成本的高低取决于市场竞争、官僚支持和政府管理能力等背景因素。在实证研究中,我们采用了工具变量估算法来研究服务外包对美国市政当局预算平衡和债务水平的影响。我们发现,服务外包改善了政府的财政状况,而环境因素对这种影响起着重要的调节作用。此外,将服务外包给不同类型的承包商对政府财政状况的影响也各不相同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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