{"title":"The omnitemporality of idealities","authors":"James Sares","doi":"10.1007/s11007-024-09629-3","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article develops an interpretation and defense of Husserl’s account of the omnitemporality of idealities. I first examine why Husserl rejects the atemporality and temporal individuation of idealities on phenomenological grounds, specifically that these attributions prove countersensical in how they relate idealities to consciousness. As an alternative to these conceptions, I develop a two-sided interpretation of omnitemporality expressed in modal terms of actuality and possibility; the actual referring to appearances in time and the possible, to reactivation at any time, on phenomenological grounds. In defense of this interpretation of omnitemporality, I consider influential criticisms against Husserl’s account of idealities as they concern time, particularly whether the historical genesis of idealities compromises their omnitemporality by binding them to time. Ultimately, I argue that the transcendental historicity of idealities, despite being relevant to the question of validity and access, proves indifferent to their omnitemporality.</p>","PeriodicalId":45310,"journal":{"name":"CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY REVIEW","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-024-09629-3","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This article develops an interpretation and defense of Husserl’s account of the omnitemporality of idealities. I first examine why Husserl rejects the atemporality and temporal individuation of idealities on phenomenological grounds, specifically that these attributions prove countersensical in how they relate idealities to consciousness. As an alternative to these conceptions, I develop a two-sided interpretation of omnitemporality expressed in modal terms of actuality and possibility; the actual referring to appearances in time and the possible, to reactivation at any time, on phenomenological grounds. In defense of this interpretation of omnitemporality, I consider influential criticisms against Husserl’s account of idealities as they concern time, particularly whether the historical genesis of idealities compromises their omnitemporality by binding them to time. Ultimately, I argue that the transcendental historicity of idealities, despite being relevant to the question of validity and access, proves indifferent to their omnitemporality.
期刊介绍:
The central purpose of Continental Philosophy Review is to foster a living dialogue within the international community on philosophical issues of mutual interest. It seeks to elicit, discussions of fundamental philosophical problems and original approaches to them. Broadly encompassing in its focus, the journal invites essays on both expressly theoretical topics and topics dealing with practical problems that extend to the wider domain of socio-political life. It encourages explorations in the domains of art, morality, science and religion as they relate to specific philosophical concerns. Although not an advocate of any one trend or school in philosophy, the journal is especially committed to keeping abreast of developments within phenomenology and contemporary continental philosophy and is interested in investigations that probe possible points of intersection between the continental European and the Anglo-American traditions. Continental Philosophy Review contains review articles of recent, original works in philosophy. It provides considerable space for such reviews, allowing critics to develop their comments and assessments at some length.